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Summary findings
Mearns  and  Sinha  report  on the first  empirical  study  of  improve  rights  for the  poor  and  reduce  transaction  costs
its kind  to examine  - from  the perspective  of  - but  only if the system  is transparent  and the  powerful
transaction  costs  - factors  that  constrain  access to land  do  not  retain  the leverage  over  settlement  officers  that
for the  rural  poor  and  other  socially  excluded  groups  in  has allowed  land  grabs.
India.  They  find  that:  Land  in Orissa  may  be purchased,  inherited,  rented
*  Land  reform  has reduced  large landholdings  since  (leased),  or - in the  case of public  land  and the
the  195Os. Medium-size  farms  have  gained  most.  commons  - encroached  upon.  Each type  of transaction
Formidable  obstacles  still prevent  the  poor  from  gaining  - and the  state's  response,  through  land  law and
access to  land.  administration  - has implications  for poor  people's
*  The  complexity  of land  revenue  administration  in  access to land.  Mearns  and Sinha  find  that:
Orissa  is partly  the  legacy  of distinctly  different  systems,  *  Land  markets  are thin  and transaction  costs  are
which  produced  more  or less complete  and  accurate  land  high,  limiting  the amount  of agricultural  land  that
records.  These  not-so-distant  historical  records  can  be  changes  hands.
important  in resolving  contemporary  land  disputes.  *  The  fragmentation  of  landholdings  into  tiny,
*  Orissa  tried  legally  to abolish  land-leasing.  scattered  plots  is a brake  on agricultural  productivity,  but
Concealed  tenancy  persisted,  with  tenants  having  little  efforts  to consolidate  land  may  discriminate  against  the
protection  under  the  law.  rural  poor.  Reducing  transaction  costs in land  markets
*  Women's  access to  and control  over  land,  and  their  will help.
bargaining  power  with  their  husbands  about  land,  may  *  Protecting  the rural  poor's  rights  of access to
be enhanced  through  joint  land  titling,  a principle  yet to  common  land  requires  raising  public  awareness  and
be realized  in Orissa.  access to information.
- Land  administration  is viewed  as a burden  on the  *  Liberalizing  land-lease  markets  for  the  rural  poor
state  rather  than  a service,  and  land  records  and  will help,  but  only if the  poor  are ensured  access to
registration  systems  are not  coordinated.  Doing  so will  institutional  credit.
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iiSUMMARY
This report presents an exploratory,  state-level  analysis in Orissa of the factors that constrain access to land by
the rural poor and other socially excluded  groups. It is the first empirical  study of its kind, at least in India,
which examines  access to land from a transaction costs perspective.  It is based on an institutional  analysis of
land administration  in policy and practice, and considers  the consequences  for particular groups of
stakeholders.  The intention of this pilot study was to field-test an approach that could be replicated in other
states of India, with a view to identifying incremental  reforms in lasd administration  and policy  that could help
to improve access to land for the rural poor. The findings  should be regarded as preliminary, since the study
was intended to scope the broad framework for analysis,  rather than to produce systematic results.
Nonetheless,  the findings do suggest a set of broad policy implications  worthy of more detailed consideration,
following systematic analysis in other states.
Land distribution: While land reforms legislation  has reduced the share of operational  area held under large
holdings (> 6 ha) in Orissa since the 1950s,  the major gains have been in the share of total area accounted  for
by medium-sized farms. Over half of all households  operate small, marginal or sub-marginal  land holdings (<
2 ha). The proportion of total agricultural  land they operate has remained substantially  unchanged since the
1950s, although substantial  gains in area accrued to the largest among them during the 1960s, thereby swelling
the ranks of farm households with medium-sized  holdings by the 1970s. The proportion of households
operating  no land, whose livelihoods  are based principally  on agricultural  labor, increased  substantially
following  the widespread eviction of tenants from erstwhile landlord  estates, and by the early 1  960s accounted
for a third of all households. Since the 1960s, some have gained access  to at least some land, but around a
quarter of all households  in Orissa still operate no land. Overall,  in spite of land reforms, socio-economic  and
demographic change over the last half century,  these trends suggest  that formidable obstacles continue to
prevent the rural poor from improving  their access to private arable land.
Land revenue systems: Historically,  different  parts of the state inherited different land revenue administration
systems from Bengal Province (northern Orissa),  Madras Presidency (southern  Orissa), Central Provinces
(western Orissa),  and the former princely states. Some 80 percent of the total area fell under zamindari
systems, in which many layers of 'intermediaries' between  the landlord and cultivator  were responsible for
exacting land revenue. Ryotwari (peasant-proprietor)  systems prevailed  over parts of southern Orissa that had
been under Madras Presidency. Some of the complexity  of land revenue administration  in Orissa today may be
attributed  to the legacy of these diverse systems,  which were brought under a unified legislative structure  only
following  independence. The legacies of these distinct systems also have certain lasting effects on the ground.
For example, land records tend to be more complete and accurate  in the former ryotwari  areas in which, unlike
in zamindari areas, there were village accountants.  This not-so-distant  historical record can be important in
resolving land disputes even today, in establishing  the basis for contemporary land claims.
Main  provisions in land legislation: Orissa is one of a few states in India that has attempted legally to abolish
tenancy (land-leasing),  except in the case of persons of disability (the definition  of which includes widows,
divorcees, and other unmarried women). Land rights may pass to any cultivator who can demonstrate
continuous occupation over a period of at least 12 years ('adverse possession'). While tenancy remains
widespread, these restrictions have led to concealed forms (e.g. oral contracts) which give tenants little or no
protection in law. A ceiling on individual  land holdings also applies, and currently stands at 10 'standard
acres' (depending  on land quality). In addition to these provisions,  which fall under land reforms legislation,
three major Acts govern land administration,  and respectively  provide the basis for land survey and settlement,
land consolidation/  prevention of land fragmentation,  and prevention of encroachment  on government  land.
The Government of Orissa has recently prepared  a draft Revenue  Administration  Bill, intended  to simplify,
consolidate and replace these separate laws governing land administration.  The clause permitting  the
liberalization  of the land-lease market  remains an obstacle to the rapid enactment  of-this law.
iiiGender and land rights: As in other parts of South  Asia, women may appear to enjoy certain land rights in
law, but they rarely translate into effective  control over land in practice, owing to embedded, gender-biased
social norms and customs. It is suggested  that women's access to and effective  control over land may be
enhanced  through joint land titling. This measure is rather limited  in scope, since ideally what need to be
promoted are women's independent  land rights. But while the principle of joint titling is readily accepted  at the
level of the Government  of India, it has yet to be realized in practice in Orissa. In focus group discussions,
village women assert that their bargaining  power vis a vis their husbands and in-laws would be enhanced
considerably  by joint title over land. The common  objection that this may make it more difficult for women to
escape from abusive  marriages was for them a second order consideration.
Organization of land administration: Land administration  in Orissa is carried out by two, parallel government
agencies:  the Department of Revenue and Excise, responsible  for policy formulation  and revenue collection;
and the Board of Revenue, responsible  for the implementation  of land policy and judicial matters. Land
revenue has declined as a share of state revenue from over 30 percent to less than 2 percent over the last forty
years. As a result, land administration  is perceived as a burden on the state, rather than a service which, if
made more efficient, could potentially contribute  to raising agricultural  productivity.  Stamp duties and other
fees payable upon the registration of land sales, on the other hand, account for up to 6 percent of state revenue.
There is little or no coordination  between  the maintenance  of land records, which is the responsibility  of
revenue inspectors  and tehsildars; and land registration,  which is the responsibility  of sub-registrars.  Measures
to coordinate these two services and enhance their efficiency  through computerization,  while at the same time
reducing  transaction costs to individuals  in the land market, could go a long way towards stimulating  the land
market. Whether or not this would enhance access to land for the rural poor, however, depends on the degree
of transparency with which land administration  is conducted in practice.  Access to information  and public
awareness of rights seem to be critical  factors. A recent initiative  of the Revenue Department,  Government of
Orissa, to disseminate  a local-language  'how to' manual on matters of land transfers and access to land
records, is a most welcome contribution  in this area.
Land survey and settlement operations: Survey and settlement  operations evolved  historically as a way to
establish  a record of rights in land, on which to base the assessment of land revenue.  Periodic, revisional
surveys, conducted every 25-30 years or so, serve as the major means to update land records. Since the process
of mutation following an individual  land sale-purchase  transaction is burdensome,  protracted and (for many)
prohibitively  expensive,  many land holders prefer to wait until the next revisional survey to obtain title to their
land. In practice,  the survey and settlement  process provides widespread opportunities  for rent-seeking on the
part of the govermnent  officers involved, and it is not uncommon  for poorer and less powerful landholders to
'lose' at least a proportion of their land in the official record. Land-grabbing by more powerful individuals,
facilitated  by exerting leverage over settlement  officers, appears  to be commonplace  during survey and
settlement operations.  While the contested  amounts of land are usually small,  the net effect is systematically  to
discriminate  against the rural poor and the socially excluded.
Four types of land transaction are considered  in the main analysis. Land may be purchased, inherited, rented
(leased) or, in the case of commons  and public land, encroached  upon. Each of these types of transaction, and
the state's responses through land law and administration,  has particular implications for the ability of the rural
poor to improve  their access to land.
Land sale-purchase transactions: These are estimated  to account for around 80 percent of land transactions  at
village level, although the share of total agricultural  land changing hands is typically as low as 5-7 percent per
year. Land markets are thin for various reasons. In large part, there are few willing sellers of land, as the price
of land does not reflect its full social value. Most sales are therefore  distress sales by smaller farmers, and most
purchases by larger farmers. High transaction costs in land markets are also a significant obstacle to land
ivpurchases. Uncertainty  regarding the true ownership  of the land is rarely a serious concern in the case of
intra-village  transactions.  However, many sale-purchase  transactions  go unrecorded in land records, since the
process of mutation (voluntary  registration  of a sale deed and acquisition  of title) is complex, lengthy and
expensive.  Officially sanctioned transaction  costs amount  to at least 17 percent of the value of the land
transacted, and the 'informal' transaction costs required  to expedite the process may amount to as much again,
even discounting  the opportunity costs of repeated visits to registrar  and tehsildar's offices over a period of
several years. The computerization  of land records may contribute  to a reduction in these transaction costs, but
only if coordinated with computerized  land registration.
Landfragmentation:  the fragmentation  of land holdings into tiny, scattered plots is a consequence of the
custom of partible inheritance, in which each individual  plot is subdivided  among various heirs. There is thus a
lifecycle effect, in which newly formed households  acquire very small holdings  on the subdivision of formerly
joint family holdings.  Land fragmentation  is widely perceived  to operate as a brake on agricultural
productivity,  and the Government of Orissa has responded by implementing  a land consolidation  program
since 1974. Land consolidation does not contribute  directly  to improving  access to land for the rural poor,
since it aims to leave land distribution  unchanged.  But as in the case of survey and settlement operations,  there
is some evidence that land consolidation  operations  result in a certain amount of discrimination  against the
rural poor and other socially excluded groups. In spite of continuing  demographic pressure, the rate of
fragmentation  actually declined from an average of 6.4 to 5.0 parcels per holding between 1961-62  and 1981-
82. Much of this decline took place before the impact of the land consolidation program could be observed,
which suggests that a certain amount of individually  initiated land consolidation  takes place through the
voluntary exchange of land plots in the market.
Evidence from the field confirms that land fragmentation  persists for two main reasons: the need to spread
risk, particularly in unirrigated areas and where soil quality is more variable; and the need to hold land as a
liquid asset, which may be sold off in discrete parcels to meet contingencies  such as marriage or funeral costs.
No data exist in Orissa on the rate of fragmentation  by district or region. Findings from the field suggest that
land fragmentation  is perceived by farmers  to be a more serious problem on the coastal plains, where land is
more reliably watered and soils are more uniform in quality,  than in the hill areas of western Orissa, where
there has been considerable  resistance  to the government's land consolidation  program. To the extent that both
poorer and better-off  farmers wish voluntarily to consolidate  their holdings in the interests of raising
productivity,  the most effective public interventions  are likely to be those that reduce transaction costs in the
land market.
Encroachment on comnons:  The rural poor partially compensate  for their lack of access to private, arable
land through access to public/ common  land. Commons  account for an estimated 20 percent of the total land
area of Orissa, including 'wastelands', grazing lands, and certain types of forest land. Over recent decades, the
best quality common  land has been encroached  upon by both resource-poor  and resource-rich  farmers, and
what remains is frequently too degraded to be of significant value. Legislation  exists to prevent encroachment
on government-owned  'wastelands', and to transfer a up to an acre of 'unobjectionable' public land to landless
families, but is largely ineffective on both counts. There are powerful incentives  for revenue inspectors  to take
bribes from encroachers  to permit continued cultivation,  rather than to initiate eviction proceedings.  More
powerful individuals may thereby acquire permanent occupancy  rights through 'adverse possession'. While
the rural poor also acquire defacto but insecure rights over revenue wastelands through encroachment,  they
are often unable to convert them to the de jure rights to which they are legally entitled, since the act of
encroachment  is regarded as illegal in the first instance.  Access to commons is especially important  in the
livelihoods  of the 22 percent of Orissa's total population  who live in 'scheduled' tribal areas. In spite of legal
restrictions on transfers of land owned by people of scheduled  tribes to non-tribal people, land alienation from
indebted tribal families remains a persistent problem.
vThe most promising avenues for protecting  rights of access to common  land for the rural poor are through
efforts to raise public awareness and access to information.  Some  NGOs in Orissa have been successful in
pursuing public interest litigation  to defend tribal land rights. Following their lead, the strengthening  of local
panchayats could make a vital contribution  towards promoting  the watchdog function of civil society
institutions.  Only with strong civil society institutions  will there be effective  demand from below for
accountability within the lower levels of land revenue  administration,  thereby limiting the possibilities for
evasion  of the legislation designed to prevent encroachment  on commons.  With such safeguards in place, the
computerization  of land records at tehsil level would  also contribute  towards making information  on the extent
of encroachment  more publicly accessible.
Land leasing (tenancy): The Orissa Land Reforms Act prohibits sub-letting  of land, regulates rents (to a
maximum of one quarter of gross produce),  and grants occupancy rights to long-standing  tenants. In spite of
these restrictions,  tenancy remains widely prevalent, under 'illegal' contracts  which landlords and tenants have
a common  interest in concealing.  This accounts  for widespread  under-reporting  of the area leased-out (and, to
a lesser extent, leased-in).  The best available  estimates suggest  that on average, around 20 percent of farm
households  participate in the land-lease  market, and that over 80 percent of leasing activity (both in and out) is
by small and marginal farmers.
There is wide inter- and intra-regional  variation in both leasing activity  and the terms of tenancy contracts.
Sharecropping  is the predominant  form of tenancy contract in Orissa, accounting for perhaps half of the total
leased-in  area, although it is declining  over time in favor of fixed-rent contracts  (whether in cash or in kind).
Share tenancy remains more prevalent  in non-irrigated  villages, owing to its greater potential for risk-sharing
between tenants and landlords.  In irrigated villages, fixed-rent tenancies  may now account for three quarters of
land-lease contracts.  Contract terms vary widely, depending  on the respective  labor and capital contributions
of tenant and landlord, the crops being produced,  and extent  to which the physical location of the leased-out
plots permits close supervision.  Regardless  of the nature of the contract,  rents are invariably  higher than the
legally stipulated  maximum of one quarter of gross production.
The land-lease  market is clearly an important  means by which the rural poor gain access to land. While there is
little evidence of exploitative relations between  landlords and tenants, there is some evidence that markets for
other factors - particularly  labor and, to a lesser extent, credit - are interlinked  with the land-lease  market.
These interlinkages  explain why it is also in tenants' interest to conceal  tenancies, and why tenants are
reluctant to press claims for lower rents or more secure rights of occupancy.  Under these circumstances,
liberalization  of land-lease  markets may well enhance access to land by the rural poor, but will be of most
benefit to them if they can also be assured access to institutional  credit. The liberalization  of the land-lease
market, as proposed in the draft Orissa Revenue  Administration  Bill, and supported by Govemment of India
policy under the Ninth Plan, is therefoTe  cautiously to be welcomed,  provided that the right balance can be
struck between assuring landlords  of their long-term ownership  rights, and assuring tenants of their security  of
tenure and protection under the law for the duration of fixed-term  tenancy contracts. Only with documentary
evidence of such rights are tenants likely to face the possibility  of access to institutional  credit.
vi1  INTRODUCTION
1.1  Background
Access to land is of fundamental  importance  in rural India. It remains the principal determinant  of rural
income distribution,  although  the direction of causality in this relationship  is not clear. The weight of
international  evidence now strongly endorses  a strategy for rural economic  growth that is based on small yet
economically viable, family-run farms. In the Indian context, in which a large and rising share of the rural
poor derive livelihoods  principally  from their own labour, a powerful  case can be made in favor of more
equitable land distribution  on grounds that such a strategy  would generate more employment  than alternatives.
In sum, with the overall objectives  in mind of reducing  poverty, raising agricultural  productivity,  and
promoting social inclusion, there are strong arguments  for seeking ways to improve  access to land for the poor
and other socially excluded groups in rural Indial.
Conventional  approaches  to improving access to land for the rural poor, both in India and elsewhere,  have
focused on land and agrarian reform. Land reform is perceived  by some to be rising up the political agenda
once again in many states of India. In the Ninth Five-Year  Plan (1997-2002)  the Department of Rural
Development, Government  of India, is focusing on land reforms, including  new strategies  to benefit socially
excluded  groups such as the selective  liberalization  of land-lease  markets, and the promotion of women's land
rights. Although state-imposed,  redistributive  land reforms are conventionally  believed to have been
unsuccessful in the Indian context (with notable exceptions),  recent evidence suggests that much more has
been achieved in implementing  Indian land reform legislation  than is often supposed.  Nevertheless, the
prospects for bringing about a meaningful improvement  in access to land by the rural poor may be even
stronger if attention is turned now to more limited,  pragmatic measures,  such as the selective deregulation  of
lease markets; and incremental  reforms in land administration  to facilitate  more rapid, fairer, and cheaper
conveyancing  procedures. Such institutional  reforms would also help to meet some of the preconditions
necessary for the successful implementation  of land consolidation  and/or land redistribution  programs where
appropriate.
1.2  Scope and objectives of study
In FY98 the South Asia Rural Development  Sector Unit of the World Bank initiated an informal study on
access to land in rural India. The overall objectives  were to contribute  to poverty reduction and rural
economic  growth in selected states of India by: (i) identifying feasible legal and institutional  reforms, policy
instruments,  or other mechanisms  to improve access to land, particularly  for the rural poor and other socially
excluded groups; and (ii) determining  the potential  role for the Bank (if any) in supporting such reforms,
instruments  and mechanisms.
During Phase I of the study, an overview  policy issues and options paper (Mearns, 1998)  was prepared based
on literature review and consultations  with specialists  within and outside the World Bank.  The aims and scope
of this review were: (i) to exanine the broad context of land relations in rural India; (ii) to identify the major
constraints on access to land by the rural poor and other socially excluded groups; (iii) to suggest priority areas
1 Patterns  of social  exclusion  tend  to be closely  correlated  though  not synonymous  with  the incidence  of poverty.  It is
well  recognized  that  people  of scheduled  tribes  and  scheduled  castes  in India  are much  more  likely  than  other  groups
to live  below  the poverty  line.  Throughout  this paper,  'socially  excluded  groups'  refer  to people  of scheduled  tribes
and  castes,  women,  and  the rural  poor.  All  of these  groups  are more  likely  than  better-off  or more  powerful  and
influential  groups  to suffer  from  forms  of discrimination  at the hands  of those  government  officials  with  whom  they
come  into  contact,  and  to be more  or-less  excluded  from  receiving  entitlements  through  administrative  procedures.
Ifor legal, policy and institutional  reform to help reduce these constraints;  and (iv) to identify areas where
further work is required in selected states to identify feasible legal, policy and institutional  reforms.
The present paper, which should be read in conjunction  with the overview  paper, constitutes  Phase II of the
study. It offers a more detailed institutional  and stakeholder  analysis of constraints  on access to land by the
rural poor at state level, as presented by the land administration  system  both in policy and in practice. At the
core of this analysis is an attempt  to specify  the formal and informal  transaction costs incurred by individuals
in the land market. Based on this analysis, priority areas for legal, policy and institutional  reform are identified.
The state of Orissa was selected for this pilot study. The intention was to refine and document the approach,
research questions, and methodology so as to provide  a 'template' for subsequent studies in other states of
India. Although land administration  is a state subject under India's constitution,  matters relating to land reform
require concurrence  at federal level. The prospects  for meaningful  reform of land administration  at the level of
India as a whole will be enhanced  through policy dialogue based on comparative information  on the diverse
ground realities prevailing  in a number of states.
1.3  Why Orissa?
Several criteria guided the selection of Orissa for this pilot study:
*  there is considerable  diversity  in agrarian systems and patterns of land tenure throughout the state of
Orissa, which offers an opportunity for comparative analysis and suggests a need to tailor
recommendations  accordingly;
*  access to land has already been identified  as a priority by the Government of Orissa (GOO), and strong
demand voiced by GOO for such a state-level study to be conducted  by the Bank. The possibility of
deregulating land-lease  markets (tenancy), and measures  to reduce land fragmentation,  were identified by
GOO as issues of particular policy concern;
*  the study findings and recommendations  may be of direct operational  relevance in the context of the Orissa
Rural Development Project, currently under preparation  by GOO for possible Bank support.
1.4  Methodology
So far as we are aware, this is the first empirical  study of its kind which examines  access to land from a
transaction costs perspective. The methods and strategies  adopted in the field investigation  were necessarily
exploratory.  The availability, quality, and sources of data were unknown at the outset, and a certain amount of
iteration  was required between the initial research questions  and what could realistically be achieved within the
time available.  Limited information  was available  from secondary  sources (particularly  village studies) for
certain, discrete aspects of the research (e.g. tenancy, land fragmentation,  or encroachment  on commons).
However, the overall  approach adopted here - namely, to analyze the factors affecting access to land within a
holistic framework,  including an institutional  analysis of land administration  in policy and practice, and
consideration  of the distributional  consequences  for particular groups - is otherwise untested.
The broad methodology  for the pilot study in Orissa included (see Annex for further details of data sources and
strategy for field investigation):
*  a review of the existing legislative,  regulatory, and  judicial framework  governing access to land in Orissa to
identify specific consequences  for the rural poor and other  socially excluded groups;
*  extensive  discussions with principal stakeholders  involved  in policy-making,  land revenue administration,
and transacting in land to identify the roles and strategies  of different  actors or stakeholders;
2*  visits to ongoing survey and settlement and land consolidation  camps to understand,  at first-hand,  the
operations and functioning  of these aspects  of land administration;  and
*  focus-group discussions in villages (in each of three selected districts)  to appreciate  the ways in which the
actual outcomes of various land administration  procedures  differ from their intended outcomes, and with
what possible consequences  for the rural poor and other socially excluded groups.
It is important  to be clear about the limitations  of this pilot study.  In part owing  to the short time available, it
was not considered desirable  to attempt to administer a formal, structured  questionnaire within a statistically
rigorous  sampling frame. Rather, semi-structured  interviews  were conducted with individual  informants and
focus groups, based on a checklist of research questions. Participatory  diagramming  methods were also used
on occasion. In order to understand  the practical functioning  of the land administration  system, considerable
flexibility and serendipity is required on the part of the interviewer  in the pursuit of unexpected leads, which
would not be possible with a standardized  questionnaire.  The data reported are considered  to be trustworthy,
on the grounds that care was taken to cross-check  the information  obtained among diverse informants  and
research  methods. Such 'triangulation' is one of the principal means of assuring  data quality when using
participatory  learning methods.
We found villagers to be generally willing to discuss  their experiences  on the 'receiving end' of the land
administration  system. Issues relating to the payment  of bribes to lower-level  government  officers could be
openly discussed. We have discounted some of the individual  reported figures in several instances, following
cross-checks with other informants.  By and large, however, the regularities  in individual  responses across the
state gives a measure of confidence in the broad picture that emerges. Rent-seeking was found to be
sufficiently pervasive that it was possible to specify  the 'going rate' in many instances. The principal limitation
of the methodology adopted is that in the short time available,  it was not always possible to probe variations as
systematically  as one would have liked, with the attendant  risk that an impression  of greater uniformity is
conveyed than is in fact the case. Based on this pilot study,  estimates of the minimum amount  time required to
complete certain stages of the field investigation  are provided in the Annex.
1.5  Analytical framework
Rights in land fall within a hierarchy  ranging from the highly restricted  to the fully specified.  'Ownership' here
refers to the most specified forn of rights in land that prevail in Orissa, including  rights to use exclusively,
inherit,  bequeath, and transfer by sale or gift. Even with privately owned agricultural land, certain restrictions
apply on the uses to which that land may be put. Under 'adverse possession', it is also possible that ownership
rights may be lost to another party if their continuous possession  of the land for a period of at least 12 years
duration can be demonstrated.  Aside from such restrictions,  ownership  rights are the most secure form of
rights in land and enjoy protection in law.
At the bottom of the hierarchy of rights in land fall usufruct (use) rights, particularly if those use rights are
declared illegal and are therefore highly insecure. An example would be customary claims of tribal groups to
cultivate on forest department  land, which are declared illegal  under the 1980 Forest Conservation  Act. Rights
to use village commons (e.g. for grazing livestock,  gathering  fuelwood  or fodder) are a more secure form of
usufruct right, but may be compromised  in practice if those commons  have been encroached.  Occupying an
intermediate  position  in the hierarchy  of rights are legal rights which, owing to prevailing social  norms and
customs, may not actually  be realised in practice. Women's rights to own land independently often fall into
this category.
In general, access to land may be enhanced  through the extension of an individual's existing rights or claims
over a larger land area, or the transfer or acquisition of a new class of rights in land, provided they are actually
3enjoyed in practice. Security of tenure  refers to the degree of confidence an individual  has that his or her
rights in land will be upheld in practice.  Ownership and usufruct rights in land can be transferred or acquired
through privately initiated land transactions  in four ways:
Land sale, which is the permanent transfer of privately-held  ownership  and usufruct rights. Land sales are
permitted so long as the purchaser's total land ownership  holding does not exceed the ceiling limit;
Land inheritance, which normally occurs  on the death of a land holder, and results in the partitioning of a
privately owned land holding among  two or more claimants.  All rights are transferred  to the claimants. This
process also frequently leads to landfragmentation  which, owing to spatial  variation in land quality, generally
takes the form of the subdivision  among each claimant of each individual  plot in the total land holding.
Administrative  attempts are made to restrict land fragmentation  in the interests  of increasing or at least
maintaining agricultural  productivity;
Land encroachment, which refers to the forcible, defacto 'privatisation' of common or government land.
Although encroachment  is illegal, the government  also seeks to redistribute ownership  rights over some public
land ('wastelands') to landless households. This apparent  entitlement  is treated separately  from the question of
encroachment,  however, so that it is not possible for a landless household to press a claim through a
spontaneous  act of encroachment;  and
Land lease or tenancy, which,occurs  when usufruct rights over a plot of land are transferred for a specified
period and for a share in the output (share-cropping),  or against a fixed (cash or kind) rent.  Ownership rights
remain with the original owner. The leasing of land is prohibited  under Orissa law, though widely prevalent in
concealed forms (oral contracts).
A principal function  of land administration  is to maintain an authoritative  record of the status and fiscal
obligations  of cultivators, to protect  their rights, and to avoid agrarian disputes. Land records in India were
initially established by means of survey and settlement operations.  Periodic, revisional surveys are undertaken
every 25-30 years or so. All land transfers completed during  the intervening  period between survey and
settlement operations are recorded at the time of the revisional survey and reflected in the updated record-of-
rights (RORs) in land. With an increasing volume of land transactions,  state governments have had to devise
various mechanisms  to respond to these transactions. Survey and settlement (section 3) is still undertaken in
Orissa without  being a response to any specific  transaction.
Government's response to individual  land transactions  is conditioned  by the existing legal framework. Thus,
land sale transactions (section 4.1) are registered and the ROR updated through the regular process of mutation
which, in principle, takes place as and when the transaction occurs. Land fragmentation  (section 4.2) is
perceived adversely  to affect agricultural  productivity.  In response, the government  implements a land
consolidation  program designed to reverse fragmentation  through the redistribution of scattered plots into
compact blocks without significantly  affecting land distribution  among individual  land holders. Land records
are also updated following a consolidation  operation. The government's response to encroachment  (section
4.3) is ambiguous as it ostensibly seeks to evict encroachers  from common land, but is more lenient with
respect to encroachment  on revenue wastelands. At the same  time, while landowners  may be penalised and
evicted for encroaching on wastelands,  landless households  are legally entitled to be settled on (i.e. acquire
ownership rights over) that land. Land leasing (section  4.4) is not recognised by the Government  of Orissa
and, in spite of being widely prevalent, is largely concealed.
This study systematically  analyses each type of land transaction and the government's responses  to examine
how the interplay between the two impinges upon access to land by the rural poor. The analytical  framework is
depicted in Figure 1.
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51.6  Structure of the report
The rest of the report is organised into four sections. Section  2 provides a brief introduction  to the state of
Orissa and the three selected study districts,  the legal framework (including  that governing  women's access to
land), and theagencies responsible for implementing  land revenue legislation.  This section provides important
background  information for the main analysis. Section 3 describes  the nature and consequences  of land survey
and settlement  operations, and assesses  their continuing  relevance.
Section 4 forms the analytical  core of the report. Using the framework developed above (Figure 1), this
section considers each of the four processes by which land rights can be transferred  from one party to another,
critically analyses the institutional  responses on the part of the state land revenue administration,  and assesses
the practical consequences  for the ability of the rural poor and other socially excluded groups to increase  their
access to land.
The concluding section identifies potential  policy options suggested  by the analysis, considers their
implications for various stakeholder  groups, and outlines suggestions for follow-up, including similar studies
in other states.
62  THE BACKDROP
2.1  Orissa  and the study districts
On the basis of its physical features and agro-climatic  conditions,  Orissa can be divided roughly into four
zones (see Map):
1. the northern plateau covering  the districts 2 of Mayurbhanj,  Keonjhar, Sundargarh  and part of Dhenkanal
district, constitutes 23 percent of the state's total geographical  area,
2.  the central river basin encompassing  Bolangir, Sambalpur  and Dhenkanal  districts, also covers 23 percent
of its landmass,
3.  the eastern Ghat region includes  the erstwhile Kalahandi,  Phulbani, and Ganjam and Koraput districts and
is spread over 36 percent, and
4.  the coastal plains of Balasore, Cuttack,  Puri and a part of Ganjam make up the remaining 18 percent.
The coastal plain region is the most agriculturally  advanced in the state as a result of high soil fertility and
more widespread availability  of irrigation.
Orissa is the second poorest state in India (after Bihar). Some 87 percent of the total population of 32 million
(1991 census) live in rural areas, and 50 percent of the rural population (head count index) live below the
poverty line (World Bank 1998). While employment in Orissa's rural non-farm sector grew at a rate of 2.8
percent a year over 1981-91  (Samal, 1997), the great majority of the rural population continue to depend upon
agriculture  and allied sectors.
Figure 2 shows the distribution  of household operational  land holdings  by size class. It indicates the change in
land distribution  brought about by post-Independence  land reforms (section  2.3), combined with demographic
and socio-economic  change. Over the period 1953-54  to 1961-62,  the number of households  not operating any
land increased substantially,  following widespread  evictions of tenant farmers after the abolition of large
landlord estates (sections 2.3 and 4.4). Estates abolition and the enforcement  of an upper ceiling on land
holding size appear to have been reasonably  effective in reducing large (greater than 6 ha) operational
holdings from 5 percent to I per cent of the total between 1953-54  and 1982. Over the same period, the
greatest gains were in marginal (0.4 - I ha) holdings, which increased  from 17 percent to 24 percent of all land
holdings. These are small,  but not the smallest land holdings.  The share of households operating  no land
declined over the 1960s, as the number of households  acquiring  sub-marginal  (less than 0.4 ha) and marginal
holdings increased, and by 1982 remained at around 25 percent of all households, which is comparable with
the all-India average (Meams 1998).
2 The  districts  mentioned  in  this section  refer  to  the 13  'undivided'  districts.  As described  in Box 1,  there  are now  30
districts  in  the state  (see  Map).
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Agricultural  land  accounts  for  59 percent  of the total  land  area  of the  state.  The  share  of total  land  area  under
various  forms  of  agricultural  land  use is shown  in Table  1. The  changing  proportions  of  total  operated  area
accounted  for by  each  size  class  of  land  holding  is shown  in Figure  3,  for the  period  1953-54  to  1982.  Land
reforms,  demographic  and  socio-economic  change  together  appear  to have  brought  about  little  net  change  in
the  share  of the total  operated  area  accounted  for  by sub-marginal,  marginal  and  small  land  holdings  (i.e.  those
of 2 ha  or less).  Within  this  broad  group,  marginal  land  holdings  (0.4 - 1 ha)  increased  their  share  of total
operated  area  at the  expense  of small  holdings  (1-2  ha).  Medium  sized  holdings  (2-6  ha)  accounted  for the
greatest  proportion  of total  operated  area,  having  gained  at the  expense  of  large  (>6  ha)  holdings  owing  to
ceilings  restrictions  and  estates  abolition.
Fig  3  Orissa:  share  of  total  operated  area
by holding  size, 1963-54  to 1982
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8Table 1:  Land use in Orissa
Land use  Share of total area (%)
Agricultural  land (gross cropped area), of which:  59
Net area sown  41
Tree crops  6
Grazing land  4
Cultivable  wasteland  3
Uncultivable  wasteland  3
Fallow land  2
Forest land, of which:  36
Reserved forest area  17
Protected forest area  10
Other (e.g. panchayat  land & village  forests)  9
Non-agricultural  land  5
Total land area (15,540,000 ha)  100
Source: Directorate of Economics & Statistics,  Bhubaneswar
Forest land makes up 36 percent of the state land area (Table 1). Over a fifth of the state population are tribal
people whose livelihoods are traditionally  derived from forest products. For administrative  and management
purposes, forests in Orissa are divided into three categories:  reserve (representing  almost half of the total
forested area), protected (just over a quarter of forested area), and other (a quarter of the forested area),
including  village forests. Reserve forests are fully under the control of the Forest Department and are
managed under various silvicultural  systems. In protected forests, only the forest crop (i.e. trees) is managed
by the Forest Department;  the land is owned and controlled  by the Revenue Department.  Rights and privileges
of local communities  vary by the type of forest -restricted in reserved forests and more liberal in protected
forests. Village forests are generally  treated as open access lands with no investment  from government, and are
generally extremely degraded except where community  protection  has started (Saxena, 1996; Singh, 1995).
There are now 30 districts in Orissa (see Map). The process of district  re-organisation  is described in Box 1.
Three districts were selected for intensive  study. The objective was to capture some of the intra-state variation
in land tenure, agricultural  and rural livelihood  systems. Initially,  it was assumed that much of this variation
would stem from the historical legacy of the different land revenue systems prevalent in the state at the time of
Independence. Consequently, one district  was selected from each of: the former Bengal revenue system
(Khurda district); Madras revenue system  (Ganjam); Central Province system (Sambalpur).  Dhenkanal district
was also selected to represent the former princely states of Orissa,  but had to be dropped from the field
investigation  owing to time constraints. As the study progressed, it became clear that there were indeed many
differences among the three selected districts in the extent and nature of private land transactions, but these
differences did not obviously or directly  result from the legacies of different land revenue and tenure systems.
Rather, they may be attributed to a combination  of social, economic,  and topographical  factors. For instance,
there is some evidence that land fragmentation  is a serious problem  in the coastal  plains. At the same time,
there are many similarities  with respect to land markets. The land sales market is more or less uniformly
depressed throughout the state. Tenancy is widely prevalent in spite of being banned throughout the state.
9Box 1:  District re-organisation  in Orissa
Orissa became a separate state in 1936 after its separation from the province of Bihar and Orissa, which was
itself separated from the province of Bengal in 1912.
On its formation in 1936,  the state of Orissa comprised six districts: Cuttack, Puri, Balasore, Sambalpur,
Ganjam and Koraput. By 1949,  the 24 princely states were also integrated  with the State of Orissa, which then
comprised 13 districts:  Cuttack, Puri, Balasore, Ganjam,  Koraput, Sambalpur, Dhenkanal, Sundargarh,
Keonjhar,  Balangirpatna,  Boudh-Khonmandal,  Mayurbhanj,  and Kalahandi. These 13 districts are now
commonly  referred to as the 'undivided districts'.
In 1973,  a Committee  was established  to consider the question of district/subdivision  re-organisation in Orissa.
No decision was taken on the recommendations  of the Committee  until 1990, apart from the renaming of
Boudh-Khondmals  district as Phulbani in 1986.  In 1992, four new districts were declared (Gajapati,
Malkangiri,  Nowarangpur, Rayagada), followed  by 10 more in 1993  (Khurda, Nayagarh, Sonepur, Bargarh,
Kendrapara, Jagatsinghpur,  Jajpur, Nuapara, Angul, and Bhadrak), and a further three in 1994 (Jharsuguda,
Deogarh, and Boudh), bringing the total number of districts in Orissa to 30. The new district boundaries are
shown in the Map together with those of the former, undivided  districts.
The selected districts are:
Sambalpur,  originally belonging to the Central Provinces land revenue system. Located on the border with
Madhya Pradesh in the north-west, it consists of a wide expanse of fairly open country, fringed by forest-clad
hills and a series of low hill ranges of irregular shape (Sarap, 1991). Over half the total area of the district is
classified  as forest land, compared with the state average of around  a third of total land area. Sambalpur
district  has a total population  of just over 800,000 (1991 census) of which nearly 75 percent live in the rural
areas. The scheduled caste (17 percent) and scheduled tribe (35 percent) population together constitute  more
than half of the district's total population. The terrain is generally rocky and undulating, which makes it
difficult to regulate the flow of water. Only 52 percent of the net sown area in the district is irrigated. Soils are
generally deficient  in nitrogen and phosphate  which limits crop productivity.
Khurda, lying in the coastal plains region of Eastem Orissa, was carved out of Cuttack district in 1993.
According to the 1991 census, its total population was just over 1.5  million. More than one-third of the people
live in urban areas including  the state capital Bhubaneswar. The scheduled caste and scheduled tribe
population  together make up less than 19 percent of the district's population. The Bengal tenurial system was
prevalent in Khurda. Only 21 percent of the district land area is classified  as forest land. Soils are fertile loams,
and a high proportion (84 percent) of the net sown area is irrigated  by canals.
Ganjam  is the largest district in Orissa, with a total population  of 2.7 million. Only 15 percent of the total
population  reside in urban areas. Ganjam formerly  fell under Madras Presidency. Scheduled castes (18
percent) and scheduled tribes (3 percent) constitute  21 percent of the district's population.  The forested area of
Ganjam district is the same as the state average (36 percent), and the share of net sown area that is irrigated is
high (94 percent).
102.2  Land revenue systems of Orissa
As more areas came under British control from the late 18th century onwards, a number of different land
revenue assessment  systems evolved according to the status of the individual of whom land revenue was
actually demanded 3. Zamindari and the ryotwari systems  were the most common and their main elements are
described in Box 2. The zamindari system existed in five districts  in Orissa, the ryotwari system in a part of a
district, and the so-called Subsidiary Alliance in the 24 princely states covered the remaining seven districts.
More than 80 percent of privately owned land fell under the zamindari system (Pathy, 1981).
A number of different revenue and tenancy laws also prevailed  in the state. This was because parts of Orissa
fell within different administrative  units belonging to Bengal (later with Bihar after its separation from Bengal
in 1912),  Central Provinces, and Madras. The 24 princely states were controlled  by the British through a
Subsidiary  Alliance by which the princes had freedom in their internal  administration  so long as they paid
regular tributes to the colonial authority. The former extent of each legislative  jurisdiction is described in Box
3.
Box 2:  Main systems of land revenue assessment in Orissa prior to Independence
Zamindari  (or landlord) tenure: land was held as an independent  property and revenue was assessed on an
individual, or a community,  owning an estate as a landlord. Proprietors  were required to deposit land revenue
at the district  treasury. One sub-divisional  officer, assisted by one or more tehsildars, was incharge of revenue
collection. There was no revenue administration  below the district level, and the zamindars organised  their
own revenue collection agencies,  often involving many more layers of intermediaries.
Ryotwari (or peasant proprietary)  tenure: land belonged to the Crown and was held in a right of occupancy
(which was both heritable  and transferable)  by individuals. Revenue was assessed on individuals  who were
the actual occupants of smaller holdings. It was collected  through the village headman whose office was
hereditary. He was paid a commission (10 percent) and sometimes  received somejagir lands. In addition to
collection of land revenue, he was also required  to keep the records-of-rights  up-to-date by carrying  out
mutations.
Under either system, there were numerous rent-paying  sub-tenants.
What, if any, is the impact of the different revenue systems  prevalent in the state until half a century ago?
While there may be little practical difference, rights over commons,  which are determined  by traditional norms
and customs, do vary across the state, and especially between  the erstwhile ryotwari and zamindari areas.
There was also considerable  variation in the quality  of land records management  since there was a village
accountant in ryotwari areas, but no such position in zamindari areas. As a result, land records were better
maintained in the former and almost non-existent in the latter. These differences can create problems during
land litigation since there may be no historical records on which to establish  the bases of competing claims.
3 The systems  had evolved  according  to the varying  degrees  in which,  in different  parts  of the country,  tribal  occupation
of territory  had  superseded  the rights  of the ruler,  or full  proprietary  rights  had been  granted  to the individual.
11Box 3:  Extent of land revenue systems  in Orissa at Independence
Bengal revenue system: covered northern part of the state, comprising  the undivided districts of Cuttack, Puri,
and Baleswar (but excluding  the princely states merged in these districts). In these areas, the Bengal Rent Act
1859 was the first legislative  attempt to regulate tenancy, replaced by Bengal Tenancy Act 1885. After 1913,
the Orissa Tenancy Act was modelled  more or less on the Bengal Tenancy Act. Many intermediary forms of
tenure subsequently developed in these  zamindari areas, and an increase in share-cropping  is suggested to date
from this period.
Madras revenue system: extended over southern  part of the state, comprising  the undivided districts of
Ganjam, Koraput, and Baliguda sub-division  of Boudhkhondmal  (now Phulbani) district (i.e. Oriya-speaking
areas of the Madras Presidency). Here the first attempt  at tenancy legislation  was the Madras Estates Land Act
1908, which applied to the zamindari areas of Madras Presidency. There were also ryotwari areas under the
state government  where the rights of landholders were governed  not by law but by executive instructions
contained in the Board's Standing Orders which had the force of law. As in zamindari areas, landholders
(ryots) could freely sublet to tenants who had no protection  under the law.
Central Province system: prevailed across  western part of state, comprising  the undivided districts of
Sambalpur  and Nawapada (i.e. the Oriya-speaking  areas of former Central Provinces).  In these areas the
Central Province Land Revenue Acts 1881 and 1917 and the Central Province Tenancy Acts 1898 and 1920
governed land revenue and tenancy.
Princely states: these partially excluded  areas had separate land settlement/  revenue regulations under the
Government of India Act 1935. There were no written laws designed to protect  the interests of tenants in most
of the princely states. The Orissa States Order 1948 conferred  occupancy rights on tenants, but no rights were
recognized for any tenants below occupancy  tenants in the hierarchy  of rights in land.
Source: Behuria (1997)
2.3  Review of existing legislation  governing access  to land in Orissa
Land legislation in India in the years immediately  following Independence  sought to reform the exploitative
and iniquitous system inherited from the British, and was motivated  by the central concern to provide 'land to
the tiller'.  To confer ownership right on tenants it was necessary  first to abolish intermediaries  and
provide security of tenure. These measures alone would have been insufficient  to realize effective ownership
rights and so it was important  also to regulate  rent. These provisions  were to be accompanied by the fixation
of a ceiling on land holdings to prevent excessive concentration  of land. While there was a national
consensus on these objectives, land was classified  as a state subject in the Constitution  and the federal states
were free to legislate to account for local specificity. During the last 50 years a number of laws have been
enacted in Orissa in order to establish  the legal framework for land reforms (e.g. Estate Abolition Act 1952,
Land Reforms Act 1960,  and Survey and Settlement  Act 1958)  and land administration. The latter includes:
the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention  of Fragmentation  of Land (OCH&PFL) Act 1972, and
the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment  (OPLE) Act 1972 (to prevent unauthorised occupation of
government land). The main provisions  and resulting  impacts of the key pieces of land legislation are
summarised in Table 2.
12On the whole, land reform legislation  has had only limited success in Orissa. Weak land revenue
administration  and lack of up-to-date land records were important  contributory factors. At the same time,
various provisions of different Acts were challenged  in the Courts because of a number of shortcomings  in the
law. Often this required amendments  to the original Acts and further delayed their implementation.
Abolition of intermediaries,  which was achieved  relatively easily  in other states, was not completed in Orissa
until 1974 owing to the absence of reliable records. Finally, a 'blanket notification' had to be issued  by
administrative  fiat. More than 6000 cases relating  to abolition of intcrmediaries  are still pending in the Orissa
High Court 4.
The initial ceiling on land ownership,  fixed at 33 standard acres5, was set at a high level and enabled
intermediaries  to evict tenants. By the time it was reduced to 10 standard acres in 1972, large landowners  had
had sufficient  opportunity to escape the ceiling limit by 'transferring' the surplus land in the name of relatives
even while they maintained  defacto control.
As in other states, the implementation  of tenancy reforms has generally been weak, non-existent or
counterproductive,  resulting in the eviction of tenants, their rotation among landlords' plots to prevent them
acquiring occupancy rights, and a general worsening of their tenure security (Appu 1997). Even though the
Orissa Land Reforms (Amendment)  Act, 1965 and its subsequent  amendments  in 1973 and 1974 conferred full
ownership rights to tenants on land in their possession,  tenants do not enjoy security of tenure as it is difficult
in practice for them to establish  their ownership  rights. This is in spite of the strict provisions under the Orissa
Survey and Settlement Act, 1958 to record names of tenants who are the actual cultivators.
The legislative  ban on leasing has led to concealed  tenancy arrangements  that have tended to be even more
informal,  shorter (increasingly seasonal), and less secure than they had been prior to reform. The provision of
the maximum rent is easily flouted, and various government  reports and village studies have recorded the rent
paid by tenants across  the state to be twice the stipulated  amount. Issues relating to tenancy are analysed in
Section 4.4.
Even the relatively  minor pieces of legislation  designed to ensure effective  revenue administration  have not
been very successful.  In the face of customary  inheritance  laws, thin land markets, and widespread variation in
land quality, the OCH&PFL Act has failed to achieve both its objectives  of consolidating  holdings and
preventing fragmentation  (Section 4.2). At the same time, increasing pressure on land combined with distorted
incentives has served to undermine  the basic provisions of the OPLE Act (Section 4.3).
The Govemment of Orissa has recently prepared  a draft Revenue  Administration  Bill, intended  to simplify,
consolidate and replace these separate laws governing  land administration.  The proposed provisions permitting
4  Member,  Board  of Revenue,  personal  comm.
5 A standard  acre  is defined  as 1 acre  of Class  I land,  1.5  acres  of Class  Il land,  3 acres  of Class  III  land,  and  4.5 acres  of
Class  IV land. Class  I land  has  perennial  irrigation  on which  two  or more  crops  can be grown,  whereas  Class  II land
is also  irrigated  but cannot  yield  more  than  a single  crop  in a year. Class  III land  is unirrigated  but on which  paddy
can be grown,  and  Class  IV  land is any  other  land.
13Table 2:  Main Provisions and Impacts of Land Legislation in Orissa
Name  of legislation  Year of  Main  provisions  Impact
promulgation
Orissa  Estate  Abolition  - 1952  *  Abolition  of intermediaries;  *  The  Act aimed at abolishing  intermediaries  but did not
OEA -Act  *  Vesting  of all land rights  in the state;  contain  any provision  of protecting  the tenant.
*  Agricultural  land less  than 33 acres  to remain  with  intermediary  *  Large-scale  eviction  of tenants  as zamindar  allowed  to
for  personal  cultivation  resume  land less  than 33 acres  for personal  cultivation
*  Owing  to the absence  of reliable  records,  abolition  of
intermediaries  not completed  until 1974.
Orissa  Land  Reforms  Act  1960  *  Permanent,  heritable  and transferable  rights  in land for  the  *  Delay in  the enactment  and actual  implementation  of the Act
- OLRA  tiller;  provided  sufficient  opportunities  for large landowners  to
(Amended  in 1965,  1973  *  Ban on leasing  of land  except  under  special  conditions  (in  escape  ceiling  restrictions.
and 1974)  1972);  *  By explicitly  banning  tenancy,  the law has swept  the problem
*  Under  adverse  possession,  land  in continuous  cultivation  for 12  of share-cropping  under  the carpet. No provision  made  to
years  or more  by a person  other  than its owner  shall  pass to the  record  concealed  tenancies.
cultivator
*  Rent  not to exceed  one-fourth  of the gross  produce;
*  Ceiling  on individual  holdings  at 33 standard  acres  - later
reduced  to 20 (in 1965),  and to 10 standard  acres  (in 1972).
Orissa  Survey  and  1958  *  Different  laws relating  to survey,  record-of-rights  and  *  Establishment  of uniform  though  defective  systems  -rights
Settlement  Act  settlement  amended  and consolidated  into  one uniform  law  of tenants  not recorded  during  settlement  operations
Orissa  Consolidation  of  1972  *  Fragmentation  of land  declared  illegal  *  Little  impact  on land  fragmentation.
Holdings  and  Prevention  *  First  choice  of transfer  to adjacent  farmer  *  Occasional  land sales but  rarely  to adjacent  farmer
of Fragmentation  of Land  *  Consolidation  of landholdings  ignored  by farmers  in western
-OCH&PFL  -Act  Orissa  because  of undulating  terrain
Orissa  Prevention  of Land  1972  *  Unauthorised  occupation  of government  land prohibited.  *  Flagrant  disregard  of the Act -widespread  encroachment  on
Encroachment  -OPLE  - *  Penalties  on encroachers  to be followed  by eviction.  both  government  and common  lands,  often  by powerful
Act  *  1982  amendment  for  settlement  of two (later  amended  to one)  groups.  Penalties  too low  to act  as a disincentive  to
(Amended  in 1982)  standard  acres  of 'unobjectionable'  land (i.e.  government  encroachers
wasteland)  with 'eligible'  beneficiaries  (e.g. landless)  *  The 1982  amendment  not a 'proactive'  right  - encroacher
cannot  'apply' to be regularised  as act of encroachment  is
regarded  as illegal  in the first place. Only RI can initiate
regularisation  of rights
*  Considerable  scope  for  rent-seeking  by revenue  officials
Source: Compiled from Behuria (1997), Orissa Land Reforms Manual (1997), Patnaik (1980), Tripathy (1992), and field notes.
14the liberalization of the land-lease market  remains an obstacle to the rapid enactment  of this law. The
initiative behind this unified land administration  law is most welcome,  since the complexity  of the existing
legislative framework, inherited as it is from diverse pieces of legislation  designed to bring together quite
different revenue systems, accounts  for much of the wide scope for evasion of the law in practice.
2.4  Women's access to land
The survey of the legislative framework in Orissa confirms  that 'land reform policies have been based on the
principle of redistributive  justice and on arguments  regarding efficiency (land to the tiller, fixation of ceilings,
prevention of fragmentation,  etc.); but on neither count are gender inequalities  taken into account' (Agarwal,
1994: 216). No law has dealt specifically  with increasing  women's access to land. Rights to land for Hindu
women are according to the Hindu Succession  Act 1956 which provides for daughters,  widow and mother of a
Hindu man dying intestate  to inherit  property equally with his sons. In practice,  however, significant and
persistent gaps exist between women's legal rights and their actual ownership of land, and between the limited
ownership rights women do enjoy and their effective  control over land (Agarwal 1994).
For example, the Orissa Land Reforms Act 1960 does not mention the order of devolution at all.  So whether
the devolution  of tenancy land will be according to personal law, or would follow a different order of
devolution, is open to interpretation. Gender inequalities  in OLRA have also arisen from enactments  relating
to the fixation of ceilings6 on two counts, namely:
*  the definition of 'family':  Article 37 of the Act defines a family as the individual  and his/her spouse and
their children,  whether major or minor. Later the law was amended  to include married daughters whereas a
childless widow is not considered  to be a member of her deceased  husband's family (Orissa Land Reforms
Manual, 1997: A67-A69).
*  recognising only men's and not women's independent  land rights: Women's rights to land are most
often subsumed under those of her husband. A woman does not count as an owner in her own right, which
leaves  her disproportionately  vulnerable to losing her land (See Box 4).
Box 4:  Constraints  on women's access to land
In a 1986 court case in Sambalpur,  the govemment Revenue  Officer, in assessing  ceiling surplus land,
aggregated the land of both spouses as 'family land', including land separately  registered in the wife's name
and inherited from her father. But the Revenue Officer gave notice only to the husband as the 'person
interested'. The two men settled the matter between them, and the wife's land was declared surplus. The wife
appealed the order to the High Court, asking that her separate land be excluded  from the ceiling surplus, on the
ground that since the land concerned was her separate property she was the 'person interested' to whom prior
notice should have been given. This, she argued, would have given her a chance  to ask the Revenue Officer to
let her retain her land and instead declare  some part of her husband's land as surplus.  Her appeal was accepted
by the High Court under the constitutional  principle of 'natural justice.'
Source: All India Reporter  (1986),  'Kunjalata Purohit v. Tahsildar, Sambalpur  and others',  Orissa 115,
quoted  in Agarwal  (1994)
6  A ceiling is fixed in relation  to a family unit consisting  of up to five members. Additional land is allowed to be held by
families  of over  five  members,  subject  to a specified  maximum.  OLRA,  as amended  in 1974,  has fixed  a ceiling  of
10 standard  acres  for a family  of five  which  can  increase  by  two  standard  acres  for  each  member  in  excess  of five,
up  to a maximum  of 18 standard  acres.
15There is, however, a deeper issue of the perceptions  of women's role in agriculture. This is reflected in
Section  2 (21) of the OLRA by which 'persons under disability' refers to, inter alia, 'a widow, or an unmarried
woman or a woman, who is divorced  or separated  from her husband ...'.  On the face of it.,  this provision is a
special consideration for female heads of households  to lease out their lands for cultivation when leasing is
otherwise prohibited. But it masks two important  underlying  presumptions:  (i) that women are perceived  to be
in need of protection  from the rigours of cultivation  and so should be allowed to lease out their land; and (ii)
that only female heads of households  should have control over land, while for other married women living
with their husbands control over land is subsumed  under the 'family'.  The first presumption  ignores the fact
that bulk of the agricultural  tasks (especially  labour-intensive  tasks such as rice transplanting, weeding and
harvesting)  are, in any case, performed  by women.
In some respects,  the OLRA is quite progressive  in that it allows land gifted to a daughter on the occasion  of
her marriage to be excluded from the ceiling area of the father. Ostensibly,  this is to encouLrage  land transfers
to daughters,  but it rarely happens in practice. Generally, women do not have RORs in their own names.  In a
family, the ROR is recorded  in the name of the husband. Extensive discussions  with women in Laderpally
(Sambalpur district) and Badavema (Khurda district)  villages reveals that women have RORs in their names
only under special circumstances as described in Box 5.  Women  would very much like to hold the patta in
joint names with their husbands to prevent indiscriminate  land sale by husbands without  their consultation 7.
Besides, in the event of a divorce, the wife would be able to claim a share of the joint property.
There was less unanimity, in both villages, on the issue of equal rights for sons and daughters. Women in
Laderpally  pointed out that equal rights for daughters will have a positive impact on the dowry problem. Very
often parents have to sell off a piece of land to arrange for a dowry for the daughter. But even if the demand
for dowry is met, there is no guarantee  that the daughter  will be able 'to live happily after marriage'. In the
event that she is sent back to her parents on some trivial ground or other, the dowry would remain with her in-
laws. Our respondents  recounted the case of one family in Laderpally  village that had sold half an acre of good
quality land for their daughter's dowry. Six months later, the daughter  was sent back to her parents.
Apparently, her husband and his parents did not like her. All the items given as dowry rermain  with the
husband. "If we had given her a piece of land instead, my daughter  would still have had it:  with her", lamented
the mother.
7 According  to the ADM Sambalpur,  joint pattas have begun to be issued in the joint names  of husbands and -wives  in two
tehsils  in the district  on an experimental  basis.
16Box 5:  When can women have lands registered in their own names?
*  After the death of husband, wife becomes  a joint share holder of the deceased's land, along with her
children.
*  If a family has more land than the ceiling set by the government, the surplus land is recorded  in the name of
the wife/daughter  to avoid ceiling  restrictions.
*  When there is no male heir in the family,  daughters  get the ROR transferred  to their names.
*  Unmaffied  women (those who could not marry and are living with their parents/brothers)  get some land in
their name. This does not come automatically,  however,  and often has to be contested.
*  There are cases in which a woman's in-laws transfer  the ROR in their daughter-in-law's name, such as in
the event that an alcoholic man's parents  believe that their son will sell off all their land.
*  In some cases, when a woman marries a widower  or divorced  man, her parents generally insist that the man
transfer some land in his new wife's name. This is done to ensure some economic security for the second
wife in case the man marries for a third time while the second  wife is alive. Another reason is that any
children the man may have by his first wife may might claim the entire property of the father leaving the
second wife with no legal claim.
Women's legal rights in land conflict  with deep-seated social  norms and customs, and are rarely recognized
socially to be legitimate. Thus, men are considered  the defacto land owners even when the ROR is in the
wife's name. For example, Janaki Panda of Badavema village (Khurda district) is the only daughter  of her
parents. She lives in her parent's house with her husband. After her father's death,  her husband was
considered  to be the household head even though she was the legal heir to her parental land. All major
decisions are taken by her husband.
While women would like to have an equal share in their parental land, they are aware of the cultural
constraints  that are difficult to overcome. For instance,  if a woman demands a share of her deceased father's
land, she often has to sever all relations with her brothers. There is usually a strong disincentive  for many
women not to press claims on parental property. This is because culturally a woman is not expected to claim
any property from her parents/brothers. If she is unmarried and/or is in a financially tight situation, she might
get some land if the brothers are sympathetic  and willing to share. Thus, there are strong pressures on women
to cede their legal rights to their brothers,  reinforced by social stigma, seclusion  practices, and other sanctions.
Given the lack of alternatives,  women tend to be dependent on their brothers for economic and social support
in the event of widowhood or marital break-up.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 have highlighted  the consequences  of the existing legal framework governing access to
land for socially excluded groups. Various factors-have  combined to frustrate the stated intentions of land
reform legislation in Orissa. However, legal restrictions  are only one part of the story. The other part relates to
the many formidable obstacles that constrain the poor (including  women) from exercising even the limited
rights they currently have. Part of the explanation for this lies in the organisational  structure and operational
procedures of the state's land revenue department,  which combine  to create high transaction costs in land
markets.  The next section describes the structure  of the land administration  system in Orissa.
172.5  Structure of land revenue administration  in Orissa
The central purposes of land administration  are to collect land revenue and to protect the rights of cultivators.
This dual role is reflected in the division of roles and responsibilities  between the administrative  section
responsible for policy formulation  and the collection  of revenue  (Revenue Department) and the Board of
Revenue  which is concerned with judicial matters and policy implementation.
The Department  of Revenue and Excise (DRE) of the Govermnent  of Orissa (GOO) functions under the
Ministry  of Revenue and Transport through Principal Secretary,  Revenue and Excise as head of the
Department.  The major activity of the DRE relates to policy formulation  in revenue administration  in the
entire state. Policies are implemented by the Board of Revenue  (BOR) headed by the Member, BOR. It is the
apex authority in the matter of revenue administration  and revenue policy implementation. It also has judicial
authority.  Coordination  of land reforms and maintenance  of land records are undertaken by the BOR. The
DRE, on the other hand, is the policy-making  body with respect to these areas. As is apparent from Figures 4
and 5, which show the organisational  structures of the BOR and DRE respectively,  there is considerable
duplication  of roles between the DRE and the BOR, which contributes  to a lack of coordination  between the
two agencies and reduces efficiency. The BOR has been described by senior revenue officials in Orissa as an
older, colonial-inherited  institution  that is declining in importance  as government  responsibilities  increase 8.
The Member, BOR, is the Chief Controlling  Revenue  Authority, whose  judicial authority is delegated to the
Revenue  Development Commissioners  (RDCs). There are three RDCs in Orissa, one for each of the North,
Central, and South Zones9. District Collectors  report to the RDC of their respective zones on revenue matters.
Each district is sub-divided into one or several sub-divisions  headed by the Sub-Collectors. The next lower
administrative  unit is the tehsil which functions under the Tehsildar.
The BOR functions through several divisions in correspondence  with different wings of the revenue
administration  (Figure 4). The Commissioner,  Land Records and Settlement  (CLRS), the Land Reforms
Commissioner  (LRC), and the Consolidation  Commissioner  (CC) are mostly concerned with disposal of
settlement  and consolidation cases. The Special  Relief Commissioner  (SRC) is responsible for all relief-
related works generally performed through respective  District Collectors and Block Development Officers
(BDOs).  The other three divisions  within the BOR have more direct, day-to-day  responsibility for the
implementation  of various land-related  provisions,  and organise  the state's responses  to privately-initiated  land
transactions  as depicted in Figure 1.
8 Other states have recognised the limited advantage  of maintaining  two parallel bodies in land administration. For
example,  there is no longer a Board of Revenue in Andhra  Pradesh.
9 RDC (North Zone) is located in Sambalpur  and covers the undivided  districts  of Sundargarh,  Sambalpur,  Bolangir and
Keonjhar. The RDC (Central  Zone) is located in Cuttack and extends  over Cuttack, Puri, Balasore, Mayurbhanj and
Dhenkanal districts. The RDC (South Zone) is located in Ganjain and covers undivided Kalahandi,  Koraput,
Ganjarn,  and Phulbani districts.
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Figure 4:  Organizational  Chart of Revenue Administration  in Orissa
19Survey and settlement: Rather than responding  to any specific land transaction, the survey and settlement
process recognises all land transfers  that have occurred since the previous revisional survey but remain
unrecorded for various reasons. The Director, Land Records and Survey (DLRS) is the nodal officer
responsible  monitoring  the survey and settlement operations  and preparation of an up-to-date Record of Rights
(ROR). Survey and settlement operations  are organised  through Settlement Officers in charge of respective
settlement zones (with each zone covering  several districts), and Charge Officers covering a 'range' or 'circle'
across more than one district.
Land registration: The government's response  to current land transfers 1I  is organised by the Inspector
General of Registration-cum-Excise  Commissioner  (IGR) who deals with registration and excise matters
through District Registrars/Sub-Registrars  and Excise Superintendents.  All policy  matters relating to
registration administration  and stamp duty are submitted by the IGR to the Government. Under section 69 of
the Registration  Act, the IGR is responsible for general supervision  over all registration  offices in the state and
shall have the power from time to time to make rules consistent  with the Act. Three Deputy IGRs are in charge
of the ranges: Northern Range at Sambalpur, Central Range at Cuttack, and Southern  Range at Berhampur.
They have the power to inspect all registration  offices falling within their ranges. At the district level, the
District Registrar is empowered under section 68 of the Registration  Act to supervise  the sub-registrars under
him. The ADM (General) usually functions  as the District Registrar with the support of a District Sub-
Registrar. There are 144 sub-registration  offices in Orissa. The Sub-Registrars,  District Sub-Registrars and
Deputy IGRs have been deemed to act in place of the  Collector  for the disposal of under-valuation cases
under section 2(9) of the Stamp Act.
Land consolidation: The Director, Consolidation  controls and monitors land consolidation  operations in the
state. The field units of the consolidation division  are organised in a similar  manner to the settlement division
with Consolidation  Officer (for a zone) and Assistant Consolidation  Officers (for ranges within a zone).
In the field, the District Collector (DC) is the superior  authority for revenue administration  in the district, and
the district-level  officers  of different  divisions of the BOR (e.g. the Assistant Settlement Officer,  Assistant
Consolidation  Officer and the District Registrar) report to the DC on administrative  issues. However, the BOR
also has a judicial role which is exercised  through these field officers. Thus, the latter report to the RDC of
their respective  zones on judicial matters. The District Collector  supervises the Sub-collectors  (at the block-
level), Tehsildars (in charge of a tehsil) and the Revenue  Inspectors (RIs, or patwaris) who cover a number of
villages within the revenue circle.
10  For  present  purposes,  land  transfers  refer  to  transfers  through  sale,  gift,  and  inheritance.
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212.6  Contribution  of land revenue to state income
After independence, land revenue in its true sense was more or less phased out in a populist political gesture to
mark a break with the colonial past. As a consequence,  there has been a sharp decline in the contribution of
land 'revenue' to the state's gross income.  As is evident from Table 3, land revenue contributed almost one-
third of Orissa's tax revenue in 1958-59. A decade later its share had fallen to seven percent, and by 1988-89  it
contributed less than two percent of total revenue. In absolute  terms, land revenue increased  by less than one
percent per year compared with an annual increase of more than nine percent in total tax revenue over the
period 1958-1988. Land revenue now amounts  to a cess rather  than a land tax and covers only a fraction of
the actual costs of land administration.  In Ganjam  district, for instance, land revenue amounts to around Rs. 10
million a year while the annual salaries of district  revenue officials alone exceeds Rs.  100 million  I  1.
Stamp duty, payable on registration of land transfers,  has also declined somewhat  as a share of total state
income over recent decades,  but remains a significant  source of revenue. The significance of stamp duty
among the various transaction costs incurred by individuals  in acquiring  land through land transfer is assessed
in section 4.1.2 below.
Table 3:  Changing share of state  revenue from different  sources  (%)
11958-59  11963-64  1968-69  11973-74  1978-79  1983-84  1988-89
Sales  TVax  27.3  32.8  40.4  45.4  47.5  50.9  56.5
Excise  Duty  17.6  13.9  19.3  13.8  8.7  8.7  7.7
Motor  Vehicles  Tax  11.2  10.8  I11.9  9.8  8.7  8.4  9.5
Electricity  Duty  0.2  5.7  9.6  8.9  14.5  15.4  17.0
Entertainment  Tax  1.5  1.7  1.8  1.9  2.6  2.2  1.4
Other  Taxes*  0.4  1.9  1.0  4.4  3.4  2.1  0.04
Total Tax Revenue  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Notes:  Totals may not add up to 100 because of rounding.
* Other taxes include agricultural  income tax, goods and passenger tax and estate duty on agricultural
properties.
Source: Meher, 1993.
l S.K. Satapathy,  District Collector,  Ganjam,  personal  comm.
223.  LAND SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT  OPERATIONS
Land revenue is a rent fixed on land on the basis of its productivity  and income. Land 'settlement' in Indian
revenue parlance refers to the assessment  of the land revenue demand  from each parcel (plot) of land. It is
preceded by:
*  cadastral survey: a comprehensive  survey of plot boundaries conducted  upon both the initial formation of
the plot (e.g. through partitioning) and any subsequent  boundary changes;  and
*  preparation of Records-of-Rights  (ROR): the ROR makes clear all interests in the land. The ROR does not
alter existing rights or create new ones, but merely  ascertains existing rights in a particular land parcel, and
by whom they are exercised.
The survey and the ROR are together used to assess the land revenue.
Prior to Independence in 1947,  different principles of rent settlement  were followed in different parts of
Orissa. The Survey and Settlement  Act, 1958  (followed  by the Survey and Settlement  Rules, 1962)  introduced
uniform procedures for survey, preparation of RORs and settlement of rent. The term 'settlement' will be used
here to refer collectively  to these three processes. Settlement  is initiated by government  in order to update the
RORs before determining  the land revenue demand.  It usually takes place once every 20-25 years although in
some places the frequency has been much lower.  The settlement  operation is organised  through field camps12
at which officers  from the settlement section camp are physically  based for much of the duration of the survey
and settlement operation. Each camp covers a number of villages within the jurisdiction of a particular police
station. The notification  for a camp is issued by the beat of drum and by posting a copy to the gram panchayat
and the RI.  A minimum notice of 2-3 months is given prior to setting up the camp at a prominent place in the
village. For instance, the settlement  camp in Badavema village in Khurda district, one of the 7 camps
operating simultaneously  in Begunia  Police Station at the time of our field study, covered 19 villages in
Begunia RI circle, and had hired out part of the gram panchayat  building.
The survey and settlement operation  consists of three main stages: cadastral survey, preparation or updating of
land records, and assessment of revenue demand.  Each of these is considered in turn.
3.1  Cadastral Survey
An essential preliminary step to settlement of land revenue is the preparation of a cadastral map of the village.
First, trijunctions of survey fields are demarcated  with stones  and used for theodolite traverses. The owners
are notified and ordered to demonstrate  their claims on the land to the amin by indicating where boundaries
have changed through mutation.  In the event of a boundary  dispute (e.g. by encroachment),  the disputed
portion of the plot is shown as representing a new, discrete plot, and remains legally registered in name of the
original ownerl3.
12 Technically,  the settlement  camp  is known  as the Attestation,  Draft  Publication  and  Objection  Hearing  (ADP  & OH)
camp.
13 To do otherwise  would  favor  the encroacher  and  therefore  give  rise  to considerable  litigation.  In practice  such
instances  of encroachment  do  not come  to the attention  of the revenue  authorities  since  they  are referred  to the civil
court, which is prohibitively  expensive  for most people. In this process, weaker and disadvantaged  land holders
often lose effective control over land which remains  legally registered as theirs.
23Fields are then measured by means of chaining and orthogonal  offsetting. A separate sketch is made for each
survey field. Plot boundaries within the survey field are also surveyed  I4.  After the map has been completed,
the survey fields are numbered and the individual  plots given sub-numbers. In the past, alleged changes in
plot boundaries were physically marked on the ground, but this practice gave rise to so much litigation  that
plot areas and boundaries are now simply compared with those shown on the previous map.  This is also
possible because most areas have been surveyed  at least once and so previous maps exist.
Amins are responsible  for plot-to-plot mapping. They follow 'The Technical Rules of the Settlement
Department of Bihar and Orissa', 1927.  The rules specify  the instruments  to be used and procedures to be
followed in the field. Survey instruments and procedures have changed little over the last 70 years, and are in
fact based on those developed  by Todormal (Emperor  Akbar's Finance Minister during the mid-16th century).
In recent years, the use of aerial survey methods has become more widespread in India 1 5. In Orissa, however,
the scheme for conducting aerial surveys is at a preliminary stage. A pilot project  has been initiated in Angul
district, in collaboration with the Research and Development  Wing of the Survey of India, but progress has
reportedly been slow due to the lack of efficient plotter equipment.
3.2  Preparation of the RORs
After the village survey, the actual boundary  of each individual  plot is determined  (kistwar), and plot-wise
information 16 provided in the prescribed  format (khanapuri).  The preliminary ROR (yaddast) is verified and
validated in consultation  with the landowner(s)  (bhujarat  and attestation). Draft khatiyans (the individual
RORs) are then prepared and objections  are invited (within a maximum  of 60 working days) from concerned
people for necessary amendments  to the records (draft  publication and objection hearing). In case of
objections,  the amin makes enquiries. On receipt of the amin's report, the Assistant Settlement  Officer fixes a
suitable hearing date. The records are amended after the objections  have been settled. Box 6 provides a brief
description  of the nature of objections at a typical settlement camp.
3.3  Settlement of rent
The amended records are brought to the Settlement  Office for rent assessment  according to the government's
rent policy (rent  fixation).  This is followed by the preparation of the final ROR for the village, including
relevant details from each landholder's final khatiyan. Four copies of the khatiyan are produced for
distribution  to the landholder(s),  tehsil office (to regularly  update any changes and record through subsequent
14 Broadly,  two types  of survey  methods  are  used:  the 'plane  table  survey'  conducted  by the Settlement  Office  for plane
surfaces/  level  ground,  and  the 'traverse  survey'  conducted  by  the Survey  and  Map  Publication  Office  for hilly
areas,  rivers  and forests. Survey  and  Map  Publication  Office  is a constituent  part of the Directorate  of Land  Records
and Surveys  (see  Figure  4).
15 The  usefulness  of aerial  survey  methods  depends  upon  topography,  vegetation  cover  and  the types  of plot boundaries.
Hilly  areas  may  require  more  sophisticated  and  expensive  photogrammetric  methods  that  eliminate  errors  due  to
altitude  differences.  Heavy  vegetation  cover  may  make  certain  boundaries  invisible,  making  it necessary  to at least
supplement  the aerial photography  with a ground survey. In general,  the use of aerial survey is most advantageous
in open  country  with  small,  irregular  fields  having  physical  boundaries.  Aerial  survey  is most  feasible  in  rural  areas
with  large,  regular  fields  having  physical  boundaries  (Hanstad,  1996).
16  Such  as land  owner(s),  forms  of land  rights,  land  use  types,  actual  area  of each  plot belonging  to the land  owner,
lease/mutation/encroachment  details,  and  other  relevant  details.  This  is primarily  a fiscal  record  to show  from  whom
the assessment of each holding is to be realised,  and the amount.
24mutations following land transfers), Collector's office, and the Revenue Inspector  (finalpublication andpatta
distribution). After the final publication  of the RORs, the field maps are prepared at the Settlement  Office to
indicate  the exact shape of individual plots within the village.
Box 6:  Nature of objections at a settlement camp
At the camp in Badavema village, Khurda district, more than 70 percent of objections  related to non-recording
of mutations for transferx  deeds (sales and partition). About  20 percent arose out of errors during demarcation.
Inheritance  (3 percent), change of land title (3 percent) and land classification  (1 percent) made up the rest of
the objections. About 15 percent of objections  relating  to inheritance  were brought by married women who
had been denied a share in their deceased father's property by their brothers.
Nearly one-third of the total number of objections were disallowed. This is a special category which relates to
encroachment  on government  land. The encroaching  parties have no patta (documentary evidence of land
rights, i.e. sale deed or title) and the objection  is thrown out. An Encroachment  Register is prepared  by the
settlement staff which records encroachment  on cultivable or non-cultivable  government land (grazing land,
burial grounds, etc.).  It is handed over to the tehsildar to pursue under OPLE.
The disallowed  category also includes cases in which, after filing the initial  objection, the concerned party fails
to pursue their claim. Such cases arise most often over  jointly-held property where the opposing claimants are
brothers who later resolve  the dispute by agreement. However, once an objection is filed, it cannot be
withdrawn. It has to be investigated  by the amin by interviewing  witnesses near the plot.  Women are rarely
interviewed as witnesses.
Settlement  officials claim that objections  usually arise out of oversight  on about 10-11  percent of the cases
handled by the settlement camp. Focus-group  discussions  with villagers in Badavema village reveals an
altogether different picture. Their perceptions  are summarised in Box 7.
At any given time, settlement operation  take place in about 4,000 of the approximately  55,000 villages in
Orissa. Revisional surveys may be thought of as a stock-taking  exercise. In a single operation spanning over
5-7 years, the area is re-surveyed,  all land records updated, and land revenue reassessed for a number of
villages within the circle of a police station. Settlement  department  officials  perceive their role as providing a
'door-step service free of charge' to the villagers as the latter are spared the effort of going to the sub-
registrar's office, paying stamp duty and all other, unofficial  transaction costs required  to register the sale
deed, and can have their rights recorded  immediately  in ROR on presentation  of the sale deed without having
to apply for mutation. That is, settlement  combines the registration  of deeds (discussed in section 4.1.1) with
the issuingof land title (mutation)  (discussed in section 4.1.2). Consequently,  many land purchasers prefer to
wait for the settlement operation  to register the transaction.
At the same time, the settlement operation:
*  is inefficient and slow - takes 5-7 years to complete settlement  in 15-20  villages, and may not be revised
for a further 30 years. In Digpandhi, Ganjam district, one recently completed settlement operation  was
conducted some 50 years after the previous settlement  operation;
*  provides an opportunity  for rent-seeking  - by government  officials who perceive themselves as providing a
service which commands a price;
25*  is prone to manipulation  by powerful interests - it is common  for people to encroach on private (or
common) land during settlement camps in order to have a larger area recorded in their names; or to attempt
to influence settlement  officers to show a larger area on the village map.  Settlement  operations often result
in increasing landlessness for the poor since it is easy for the more powerful to buy off settlement officers
in their favour,  leading to dispossession  of poorer and weaker groups; and
*  is likely to become irrelevant with computerisation  - settlement  operations will become unnecessary  if the
mutation system is improved to as to permit regular and more rapid updating  of land records (section
4.1.3).
These shortcomings raise serious doubts as to the need to persist with settlement  operations which might have
outlived their utility. Some of these shortcomings  and their distributional  impacts are highlighted in a case
study of farmers' experiences  in Khurda and Ganjam districts in Box 7.
3.4  Conclusion
Land settlement is a carry-over  from the British period when its main purpose was revenue assessment at what
were then lucrative  levels for the colonial administration.  Under  zamindari tenure, in which single proprietors
possessed large estates, the State revenue was assessed on the ascertained  or assumed rental value. The
revenue, though fixed with reference  to acreage  rates on the land actually cultivated,  was assessed on, and
payable by, the estate as a whole. The assessment  remained  unchanged for the period of the settlement. The
proprietor  could bring as much of the wasteland under cultivation  as desired,  and it was only on re-assessment
at the end of the term of the settlement  that the state could obtain  any increase of revenue on account of the
extensions of cultivation during the settlement  period. The regular practice of revenue assessment,  updating
and maintenance  of land records were absent in the zamindari tracts since the tenants and sub-tenants were
'tenants-at-will' and as such had no heritable or transferable  rights in land. By contrast,  land revenue
administration  systems in khasmahal  and ryotwari tracts were in much better shape.
Periodic  settlement operations  were the most cost-effective  way of settling a large area in a short time. There
was little need for sporadic settlements  because land was rarely transferred  or partitioned 17. Moreover,
settlement  made sense when new lands were being brought under cultivation, i.e. without any transfer of
ownership.  The survey and settlement process may have outlived its utility is the same work can be done more
efficiently  by a smoothly functioning  registration and mutation process. The system of deeds registration is
examined in the next section.
17 This  is not  to suggest  that  land  sales  markets  were  absent  during  the late 19th  and  early  20th  centuries.  There  were
several  classes  of tenancies in  zamindari  areas (especially  privileged  tenancies  based  on service)  that  were heritable.
Rent-collection  contracts  were  also  bought  and  sold (K.C.  Shivaramakrishnan,  personal  comm.).
26Box 7:  'They  knock on  your door to collect bribes'
Farmers' main problems during survey and settlement operations  relate to the rampant rent-seeking by
government  officers and the manipulation  of the process by the large landowners  to their own advantage.
Objections are invited to correct any mistakes that might have occurred during  the preparation of the yaddast
and the draft khatiyans. This is the primary stage of rent-seeking by officials at the settlement camp. The two
common  types of errors are that the land is shown in somebody  else's name, and that the area recorded (e.g.
0.75 acre) is smaller than the actual area owned (e.g. 1 acre).
A sum of around Rs. 500-1,000  is usually demanded  to correct the mistakes. Landowners are convinced that
mistakes are made on purpose. For, "if these are genuine mistakes, why do they demand money to correct
them?"
Manipulation  of the process by the large landowners  emerged as a major issue in focus group discussions with
landowners in Digpandhi tehsil, Ganjam  district. Numerous instances were reported of alterations being made
during the preparation of the preliminary  RORs owing to the influence  of large (and perhaps literate) farmers
over settlement  officers.
In spite of these problems,  landowners still prefer the settlement  operation  to mutation through the tehsil office
since they find settlement procedures  to be less cumbersome.  They report that with settlement,  at least 'there is
a single-window  for  bribes'; 'you don 't have to make repeated trips to the tehsil office ', 'you save on transport
costs and don't lose the daily wage'.
It is widely acknowledged  that government  services were generally  not performed without paying a bit extra.
An elderly landowner in Badaverna village,  Khurda district, explained  the difference  between settlement and
regular mutation as follows: 'during a settlement operation  they come to your door to collect bribes, whereas
for ... mutation you have to go to the tehsil office  to pay bribes.. and.. at the end of the settlement process (5-7
years) you can be sure that your work will be done if you have paid the money.'  He cited the case of one
farmer who has been unsuccessful in getting  patta to a plot of land he bought 12 years ago even though he had
made repeated trips to the tehsil office. It seems  the previous RI was not sufficiently 'happy' and so some of
the papers have now gone missing.
Ideally, people would prefer to get the ROR at the time of registration  of the sale deed.
274.  LAND TRANSACTIONS  AND STATE RESPONSES
4.1  Land sale transactions
Land can be transferred from one party to another  through sale/purchase,  gift, inheritance,  mortgage  and
tenancy. The last two are of a temporary nature and are excluded from discussion  in this section. Data are not
available from which to assess the relative volume of each type of transaction in Orissa. Discussions  with
revenue inspectors  suggest that sale/purchase  transactions  constitute nearly 80 percent of all annual land-
related transactions  in a village, while gifts comprise 10 percent, and inheritance  the remaining 10 percent
(around a half of which result in partitioning of a land holding).
Throughout  rural India, land markets are incomplete,  imperfect  and often (though decreasingly)  interlinked,
resulting among other things in the persistence  of marginal and sub-marginal  operational  holdings which can
neither be easily added to nor disposed  of (Meams, 1998). The situation in Orissa is consistent with this trend.
A recent study reported that only about seven percent of farm land changed  hands (through 88 sale/purchase
transactions) over the period 1955-95  in a village in Sambalpur  district (Sarap, 1998). There were wide
fluctuations  but the maximum  area sold in any year was three acres. Based on a longitudinal survey of two
villages in Cuttack and Dhenkanal districts  over the period 1965-95,  Swain (1998) also reported that around 5-
7 percent of village land was bought and sold. Thus, in general, the land market in Orissa is thin, with wide
fluctuations  in levels of activity.
A land sale has first to be registered before mutation of the RORs of the transacting parties can be effected.
This section analyses the various processes in executing land sale transactions  to identify the limiting
constraints  on land transfers, and specifies  and attempts to quantify  the transaction costs involved. The section
also examines, in light of recent research, whether removal of these constraints  or reduction of transaction
costs would indeed help to facilitate  land sales and increase  access to land by the rural poor.
4.1.1  Registration
The prevailing system of land registration  in India, developed under the British colonial administration,  is
governed by the Indian Registration  Act, 1908,  which provides for the registration of deeds in the case of
transfers of immovable  property including land. Subsequently,  various regulations were passed at different
times to suit local needs and facilitate  registration of documents. The registration system aims to provide a
public record of land ownership to protect individuals  from being deceived by entering into transactions
relating  to properties previously disposed of, and to provide notice of the existence of certain continuing
interests, encumbrances,  and claims.
Sales of immovable  property18 are first executed on a non-judicial  stamp paper of the prescribed  amount19.
This constitutes the 'sale deed' and is necessary  to make the transaction effective under the law. The value of
the stamp paper is also known as the stamp duty. Stamp duty is fixed as a proportion (currently at 4.2 percent)
of the total value of the transaction. In addition,  a stamp duty surcharge is levied at varying rates as shown in
Table 4. The stamp duty is payable by either the purchaser  or the seller, subject to agreement between them.
18 Along  with  wills,  power  of attorney,  movable  assets,  etc.
19 Stamp  papers  are a monopoly  of private  vendors.  Recently,  a shortage  of stamp  papers  has led  to charging  of illegal
premiums  by the vendors  and  widespread  attempts  to undervalue  the transaction.  In order  to reduce  such  transaction
costs,  a proposal  to introduce  franking  machines  for  supply  of non-judicial  stamps  in Orissa  has  recently  been
approved  by the Cabinet  (J.K.  Mohapatra,  Revenue  Secretary,  GOO,  personal  comm.).
28The original sale deed and a photocopy are produced before the district sub-registrar  at the district-level,  and
the sub-registrar  at the tehsil level, for registration. The clerk compares the photocopy with the original and
attaches a certificate. The purchaser  then deposits the registration  fee (2 percent of the value of the
transaction) and is expected to collect the registered document  at a later date. However, such registration is
voluntary and the validity of the sale deed is not the concern  of the registering  officer. It is estimated that
about 10 percent of all registrations are illegal, in which government  land or land belonging to someone other
than the vendor is sold to unsuspecting  purchasers. Such cases tend to he in urban areas where information
asymmetries  are high. In the rural areas, land is almost always inva 1jably bought and sold within a village in
which people know each other20.
The value of the property sold/purchased  is verified (from a valuation  register) at the time of registration  to
ascertain that it is not below the current market  price. The highest value at which a particular type of property
in a particular area is registered in the last three years constitutes  the present market value of that property.
This verification is necessary to prevent under-valuation,  and thereby depresses the future 'market' rate2 1.
Other activities of the sub-registrar's office include:
Preservation of document copies: Four types of registers are maintained  at the registration offices: Book 1
contains  the certified photocopies of documents  relating  to immovable  property. Book 3 is concerned with
wills. Book 4 consists of documents  dealing with the power of attorney, adoption of movable assets, etc. Book
2 records all transactions  that are disallowed  by the registrar's office, for example, in the event that one of the
parties is a minor, stamp duties and registration  fees have not been paid, or the transaction falls outside the
jurisdiction of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
Issue of encumbrance certificates: Persons keen to know encumbrances  on a property over a given period of
time provide details of the property and the period for which information  is required, and deposit the fee for
the search and preparation of the certificate.  On receiving the request, the clerk searches the Index II register of
the village in which the property is located for the required  period.
Issue of certified copies: Persons requiring a certified  copy of a document have to deposit search, inspection
and copying fees. Search is done on the Index register from which the preserved  photocopy of the document is
located and copied manually onto stamp paper.
Back office activities: These include preparation of: (i) Indexes I and II to help search for the information  for
issuing encumbrance  certificates and certified copies, (ii) valuation  register which records information,  for
every village, on date of registration,  area and type of land, and its value, (iii) fee book which maintains
records of different  types of fees collected such as registration  fee, search fee, inspection fee, copying fee, and
miscellaneous fee like marriage fee and petition fee, and (iv) the monthly receipt and expenditure  statement.
Stamp duty and registration fees are important  sources of revenue for the state government. In 1988-89  (the
last year for which comparative data are available),  income from stamp duty and registration fees together
constituted 6 percent of the state's revenue  (Table 3). While its relative contribution  to total state income has
declined from 10 percent in 1958-59, in absolute terms stamp duty and registration fees contributed nearly
Rs.600 million to state income from various sources in 1997-98  (Table 5). This figure, however, does not
20 It is customary  for  the purchaser  to invite  the seller  for  a meal  which  can  typically  cost  Rs. 500.
21 Gift  transfers  avoid  stamp  duty. So if land  is being  transferred  between  brothers,  they  would  prefer  to show  it as a gift
rather  than  as a sale  to evade  stamp  duty.  No stamp  duty  is payable  in inheritance  cases.
29Table 4:  Description  of charges  relating to registration  of land transactions
Type of charge  Rate  Details
Prescribed  in Schedule  IA of the
Stamp  duty  4.2%  Indian  Stamp  Act,  1899  -
frequently  revised.  Present  rate
fixed  since  1985.
Stamp  duty  surcharge  Value  Rural  Urban  Surcharge  levied  for sale,  gift,
Upto  Rs.  settlement,  mortgage  and  lease
2,000  6.2%  7.2%  transactions  vide  Additional
Rs.  2,001-  Stamp  Duty  Act, 1986
R.s.  5,000  7.7%  9.2%
Rs.  5,001-
Rs. 10,000  8.7%  11.2%
Rs. 10,001-
Rs.25,000  9.7%  12.7%
Above
Rs.  25,000  10.7%  14.7%
Registration  fee  2%  Payable  under  the Indian
Registration  Act,  1908
Mutation  fee  Rs. 8  For transfer  of Form  No. 3 from
the sub-registrar's  office  to the
tehsil  office  for  initiating
mutation.  Also  the fee  paid in
inheritance  cases  to initiate
____________________________________  mutation  at the tehsil.
Writing  of the sale  deed  Rs.  40-50  Paid  to private,  licensed  scribes
(mohoris)
Demarcation  fee, if part  of a  Rs. 4 per  plot  Penalty  for not  purchasing  whole
plot  plot. Paid  to the tehsil  office  for
it to undertake  demarcation  of the
new  plot
Search  fee  Rs. 17  To check  last 12  years' records  -
________________________  __  mostly  in urban  areas
Endorsement  fee  Rs. 5
Incidental  fee  Rs. 2  As witness  fee if paying  money
Consenting  fee, ifjoint  Rs. 40 per person  To get permission  of joint holders
property  l  of the property
Note:  Figures in percentage are as percent of the value of the transaction.
Source: Inspector-General  of Registration,  Board of Revenue, Cuttack, 1998.
reflect the true volume or value of land transactions  owing to the widespread practice of under-valuing
property in order to reduce stamp duty and registration  fees payable (Box 8)22. The latter are fixed as a
proportion of the value of property  being bought or sold, and usually amount to 17 percent of the registered
value of the land transferred. Even taking under-valuation  into account, this represents  a highly significant
transaction cost. Issues relating to rationalisation  of the stamp duty to prevent evasion are discussed in Box 8.
22 The  RI,  Begunia  circle  was  not sure  of the incentive  to undervalue  property  since  using  the land  as collateral  a land
purchaser  is able  to obtain  bank loans  for 10  times  the face  value  of the land  shown  in  the sale  deed.  He estimated
that increasing  access  to formal  credit  is the primary  motivation  for  around  a quarter  of all land  purchases  in  the
region.
30Table 5:  State income from land registration  (Rs. million,  at current prices)
1994-95  1995-96  1996-97  1997-98
Head of  Target  Actual  Target  Actual  Target  Actual  Target  Actual
Account
Stamp  duties  503.50  401.80  763.80  500.60  687.50  566.30  855.10  488.30
Registration  118.40  8150  132.60  89.50  112.40  112.20  174.80  110.30
FeesI
Total  621.90  483.30  896.40  590.10  799.90  678.50  1029.90  598.60
Source: Inspector-General  of Registration,  Board of Revenue, Cuttack
4.1.2  Mutation
Registration  of deeds is followed by mutation, which is to register a change in the record-of-rights  in land. Sale
deeds carry no guarantee of validity, and therefore offer no conclusive  evidence of rights in land. Once
mutation has been effected, the government,  through the tehsil office, provides the landowner with
documentary evidence of rights in land, locally called a patta2 3, which amounts to evidence of land title. A
legal interest in land is not created or transferred  until mutation  takes place. However, as we describe below,
this process is both lengthy and costly, and many landowners  do not bother to embark upon it, preferring
instead to use their sale deed as evidence of their land rights, and to wait until the next survey and settlement
operation  during which they expect to be issued  with apatta after the land records have been updated.
Registration  of transfer deeds of any property is intimated  by the sub-registrar  to the concerned tehsildar in a
prescribed format (on Form No.3). This information  is used by the tehsildar to effect the mutation in the
ROR24. Mutation refers to the amendment  of state records to reflect a change in ownership  or other rights in
land through sale/purchase, gift, inheritance  or mortgage 25.
Before making any change in the ROR, the Tehsildar 26 calls for objections  to the transaction  within a
stipulated period. Any objections to the transaction are dealt with by the tehsil court. Sometimes,  the matter
may be referred to the next higher court of the Sub-Collector  or above. Once the mutation is allowed, the
Tehsildar issues a notification  to update the RORs of the land transferor(s)!  transferee(s). After mutation and
correction of RORs, a 45-day appeal period is allowed for challenging  the mutation. This is particularly
relevant in the case of multiple brothers with potential  claims on a parcel of land, one of whom may challenge
the transaction.  Finally, certified  copies reflecting  the latest status of land ownership are issued to the seller(s)
and purchaser(s), the copy of the original record maintained  at the Tehsil office is up-dated, and necessary
corrections are made in the village map to reflect the most recent plot boundaries.
23 Patta locally  means  a card,  and  is probably  derived  from  the English  system  which  used loose  cards  prior  to
computerisation.
24 The  Form  includes  information  on village,  thana, khata number,  plot  number(s)  and  respective  area(s),  amount  of rent,
type  of transfer  (sale/gift/partition),  name  of the registration  office,  registration  number,  and  the names  and addresses
of the vendor(s)  and  vendee(s).
25 Mutations  arising  from  inheritance  do not have  to be registered  and  are initiated  at the tehsil  office  (without
submission  of Form No. 3).
26 However,  the tehsildar  is not empowered  to mutate  cases  during  settlement  operations.  At such  times,  mutation  is
carried  out by  the Settlement  Officer.
31The process of acquiring  apatta  after a land sale/purchase  can take a minimum of 3 months if there are no
objections at any stage (Table 7). Typically,  it takes 3-5 years and entails numerous trips to the tehsil office by
the purchaser. If for some reason the RI is not kept 'happy' by the purchaser it may take as long as 12 years
(Box 8). Often the size of land parcel for which the patta is issued is less than the size of land parcel actually
purchased. For instance,  two brothers Ishwar and Ulla Gowda of Gopalpur, Ganjam district, purchased 2.12
acres from Chanchala Pradhan. The  patta records 2.06 acres even  though they cultivate  the full extent of the
2.12 acre plot. Ishwar and Ulla Gowda fear that problems are likely to arise when they decide to sell the plot.
The new purchaser  would negotiate on the basis of the existing  patta and pay for only 2.06 acres while
actually acquiring the full 2.12 acres.
Delays in processing, discrepancies,  and rent-seeking seem  to go hand in hand. It is argued by revenue
department  officials that these are a consequence  of the excessive work burden of the revenue inspectors and
registration clerks. This is discussed  in the following section.
4.1.3  Land records management
Following land settlement and registration,  the RORs and copy of the maps are supplied to the Tehsildar  who
is expected to maintain and regularly  update them. However, it is commonly observed  that the RI rarely
corrects the RORs on time, and mutation cases remain pending for many years, thereby severely
compromising  the rights and interests  of individual  land holders.
Often inefficiencies arising from poor maintenance  of RORs and the field maps increase transaction costs. It is
argued  that high transaction costs in sale and purchase of land place a disproportionately  high burden on the
rural poor, and are likely further to depress the land sale market  thereby reducing  their access to private, arable
land. This section examines  whether rationalising  the responsibilities  of the RI and the tehsildar in the course
of the computerisation  of land records and land registration  would be likely to have a positive impact on the
efficiency  of land administration.
While the present system of land record management  owes its origin to Todarmal,  it was mainly  developed
under British rule in the 19th  century. The colonial administration  relied almost entirely  on revenue from land
and so an efficient land records system  was essential to its survival. However, regular updating of land records
was rare. In zamindari areas, the intermediaries  were only interested  in collecting  rent.  For this part-time rent-
collectors  (e.g. guntia in Orissa)  were hired and there was no systematic system for land records management.
Most of the updating occurred  during periodic settlement operations.  A large proportion of Orissa's land area
fell under zamindari tenure and so for all practical purposes, Orissa was a 'non-land record state'.
The need to improve and strengthen land revenue administration  has long been recognised. As early as 1958,
the poor state of land records was identified as one of the important  causes of the failure of land reforms (GOI,
1958). Thirty-five years later, the then Prime Minister remarked:
Many Chief Ministers  have told me that even if they do not expect any money out of land revenue,
they would like to see someone to keep the land records because it is a record of rights. If nobody has
a record of rights, might becomes right....Whether  any land revenue is paid, whether that amount is
considerable or not, whether that needs to be collected  still or does not need to be collected, ... the
maintenance of land records is a must and that has to be done. (Rao, 1992: 6-7)
However, constant  reiteration in successive  Five Year Plans of the need to improve and strengthen land
revenue administration  and update land records has done little or nothing  to arrest their neglect on the ground:
32Box 8:  Would  a reduction  in stamp duty increase state revenue?
Under-valuation  of property is as widespread  as it is illegal. Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act (Orissa  Amendment)
1962,  and its recent amendment  of 1987,  prohibits under-valuation  of documents for evasion of stamp duty. Clear
procedures  have been prescribed  for determination  of market  value which is the highest price of a particular type (kisam)
of land of the village transacted  during the last three years. The value of the property being sold or bought cannot be less
than the government-determined  market  value. While the degree  of undervaluation  is difficult  to estimate, revenue
officials suggest  that fewer than five percent of the documents  are undervalued. Villagers in different parts of Orissa are
convinced  that only about five percent of the cases may be genuinely  valued.
The main reason for under-valuation  is to evade payment of stamp duty which is prescribed  as a percentage of the value of
the property. Transactors  agree to transfer the property at the market  price but register a price that is only just higher than
the government-determined  value of the land. How do they get to know of the government's value of the property? In
this, the transactors are assisted by an army of clerks, stamp vendors, and touts hanging around the sub-registrar's office,
who have an exact idea of the existing rate for a particular  type of land in a particular  village. Quite clearly, the
information is leaked from inside the sub-registrar's office to enable the transactors  to keep the value of the land down,
but just above the government's valuation of the property. The prevailing  market rate appears  to be in the order of 25-50
percent higher than the government's assessment.  Table 6 presents  two case studies  that indicate the extent of revenue loss
through under-valuation  of property. It is difficult  to generalise  from limited evidence  but it seems that the state is losing
at least 25-50 percent of potential  revenue from stamp duty and registration  fees.
Do the transactors benefit by saving the money which would have been spent on paying the stamp duty? Obviously not.
The information  comes at a price. Table 7 shows the additional,  informal costs incurred at various stages of a land sale
transaction. These additional  costs are approximately  equal to the estimated loss of revenue  to the state in both cases
(Table 6).
In July 1997,  a Committee of State Finance  Ministers  recommended  rationalisation  of rates of stamp duty to reduce
hardships and harassment of people. It has been suggested  that the rate of stamp duty be fixed within a band of 10.5
percent to be gradually  narrowed  to 8.5 percent of the value of the land transacted. The Committee  recommended  that the
rate of stamp duty be coupled with proper valuation of property to reduce  loss of revenue  to the state. GOO has accepted
the recommendation  of the Committee  to set up a Central Valuation Cell under the Inspector-General  of Registration  to
lay down guidelines for proper valuation and assess the value of land in different areas from time to time.
However, the extent of corrupt practices  surrounding land registration  and mutation  seemed to have become
institutionalised  and do not appear  to be perceived as 'corrupt' by land transactors. They recognise that the transaction
will entail additional costs of about Rs.1,000-2,000  for the purchaser  and try to negotiate  the price beforehand. Without
under-valuation  the additional costs to the purchaser  would not have exceeded this amount, but at least would have gone
to the state exchequer.  So why do transactors allow officials  to siphon-off  money? The main purpose of paying extra for
services is to reduce  the time spent for each activity.  It seems unlikely  that rationalisation  of rates of stamp duty alone
would reduce  the extent of undervaluation, and of stamp duty evasion. This is because  there are a number of stages where
transactors can be at the mercy of officials  (Table 7). It is better to 'keep them in good humour' by paying the 'going rate'
rather than delaying the process. However,  two things might help. One, stamp duty could be levied per area for the
particular type of land bought or sold since plot area is more difficult to disguise. Alternatively,  a flat rate per transaction
may be considered. The latter, of course, has the disadvantage  of placing a disproportionate  burden on small transactors.
Two, extensive  computerisation  of the registration  administration  and its link-up with the tehsil computer will reduce the
time taken during some stages (shaded areas in Table 7) and thereby, obviate the need to pay 'speed money'. Both options
taken together, rather than the rationalisation  of stamp  duty alone, are likely to increase  the state's revenue  and reduce  the
additional costs incurred by the purchaser.
33Table 6:  Loss of state revenue through  under-valuation  of property
Case I: Laderpally  village,  Sambalpur  district
0.6 acre of land transacted @  Rs. 60,000 per acre
Sale price negotiated  between transactors  (P1):  Rs. 36,000
Price disclosed for deed registration  (P2): Rs. 27,000
(Rs.)
Item  Expenditure  under  Loss to the state
P1  P2
Stamp  duty  @4.2%  1,512  1,134  378
Stamp  duty  surcharge  @10.7%  3,852  2,889  963
Registration  fee @2%  720  540  180
Mutation  fee  8  8
Writing  of sale  deed  50  50
Endorsement  fee  5  5
Incidental  expenses  2  2
TOTAL  6,149  4,628  1,521  (25%)
Note:  *  The figure in parenthesis  is the percentage  loss of revenue to the state.
Case II: Badaverna  village,  Khurda district
0.65 acre of land transacted  @  Rs. 40,000 per acre
Sale price negotiated  between transactors (P1):  Rs. 26,000
Price disclosed  for deed registration (P2): Rs. 19,500
(Rs.)
Item  Expenditure  Loss to the state
Actual  Shown
Stamp  duty  @4.2%  1,092  819  273
Stamp  duty  surcharge*  2,782  1,892  890
Registration  fee @2%  520  390  130
Mutation  fee  8  8
Writing  of sale  deed  50  50  _
Endorsement  fee  5  5
Incidental  expenses  2  2
TOTAL  4,459  3,166  1,293  (29%)**
Note:  *  Stamp duty surcharge,  in rural areas, on land value more than Rs. 25,000 is
10.7% and for less than Rs. 25,000 it is 9.7%
**  The figure in parenthesis  is the percentage  loss of revenue to the state.
34Table 7:  Additional transaction  costs in the land market
Stage  Step  Person  Approx.  Additional costs
involved  time taken
. ~~~~~~~  ~~~Approx.  Purpose
. :  ~~~~~~amount
REGISTRATION  j 
s  :  . r  S \  =  .........  . ,  . . 7  ~~T o  undervalue  the
Execute  Licensed  price  of land  and bring
transaction  on  Vendor  Neg.  Rs. 50  it in line  with  the
stamp paper  prevailing  government
REGISTRATION  rate
Tehsildar  invites
objections  to the sale  on  receipt  of Form  No.  3  from  Tehsildar  2  weeks MUTATION  the  registrar's
office
-Patia issued if  Revenue  4 weeks  Rs. 400-500  For speedy issuance  of
no objections  inspector  the patta
- If objections  Tehsildar  5 years*  -
*  If there are objections from, say, joint owners, a case is registered in the tehsildar's revenue court, in the first
instance, for hearing and disposal.
Shaded rows indicate activities  where computerisation  might benefit  the transacting agents by reducing  their
transaction costs.
Source: Compiled from field notes.
35In states like.. Orissa.. there is no system of the annual revision of the record of rights.  ..The records are
usually brought up-to-date only during re-survey  and settlement. As these operations are usually done at very
long intervals the records remain  out of date most of the times (Appu, 1997: 102-3).
Poor land records often lead to:
*  Difficulty in protecting land rights: Land records specify  the rights of individuals and the state with
respect to a particular parcel of land. It is difficult  to uphold rights if they are not recorded or updated
regularly.
*  Difficulty in targeting development  initiatives: An inefficient land records system makes it difficult to
retrieve  timely information  for purposes of policy formulation  and targeting of state benefits.
*  Increase in rent-seeking: Lack of records restricts  the flow of information  and gives rise to economic
rents that may be captured by government  officials.
*  Increase in rural/agrarian  violence: While poor land records do not directly lead to agrarian violence,
they contribute  by making it difficult to enforce rights and target benefits  to the poor.
*  Encroachment of government land: Poor or partial maintenance  of land records has led to the steady
encroachment  of government  land.
*  Uncertainty  in conveyancing. An imperfectly  maintained  land records system increases the costs of all
land transactions  and prevents the development of a freely functioning  land market.
*  Inability of landowners  to access credit: Poor land records make it difficult to use land as a collateral to
raise credit in both institutional  and informal markets.
Various plan documents  have recognised  these factors, and a conference of revenue ministers on land reforms
in 1985  reached a consensus  that 'computerisation  of land and crop-based statistics should be taken up on pilot
basis at tehsilVrevenue-circle  level' (GOI, 1985:54). Computerisation  of land records (COLR) is now being
implemented  to redress this shortcoming. It is hoped that it will:
*  facilitate  easy maintenance  and updating  of changes that occur in the land data base (e.g. changes due to
availability  of irrigation,  natural calamities, consolidation  or on account of land transactions);
*  make land records tamper-proof and indirectly  reduce litigation  and social conflicts over land;
*  facilitate implementation  of development  programmes  for which data about distribution  of landholding is
vital;
*  assist in planning for infrastructural  and environmental  development;
*  produce accurate records for land revenue purposes;
*  facilitate speedy retrieval of land-related  data;
*  provide a database for the quinquennial  agricultural  census; and
*  issue updated copy of RORs to landholders  quickly and more cheaply.
COLR is a central-sector  scheme with full financial  assistance  from Government of India (GOI). Orissa is the
only state in the country in which the scheme is being implemented  in all districts. A sum of around Rs. 300
million has been made available by the GOI for three years to cover data entry in the local language (Oriya),
civil construction, purchase of hardware, and operational  costs during that period.  GOO will take over full
responsibility  for the operation  at the end of the three-year  period.
The scheme is to be executed on a district-wise  project basis through the Revenue department. Private firms
have been contracted to enter the records in 10 districts 27 in the first instance. The target for data entry is 90
27 The  districts  are:  Ganjam,  Cuttack,  Kendrapada,  Jagatsinghpur,  Bhadrak,  Khurda,  Bargarh,  Dhenkanal,  Angul,  and
Nayagarh.
36days per tehsil and work will be carried out simultaneously  in all tehsils. Validation of information  will be
undertaken by the Board of Revenue  staff while the data is being entered. But only data entry is to be
checked, not the RORs themselves.  Training  of tehsildars will take place in a phased manner. A computerised
land pass book will be provided to each individual  landowner  to maintain  a proper account of land
transactions. This will also serve as documentary evidence  of rights in land for such purposes as raising
institutional  credit.
Since the project has only recently begun in Orissa it is too early to assess its possible impact. However,
COLR was originally mooted during the Seventh Five-Year  Plan and some projects were taken up in a few
states as pilot projects during 1988-89  to 1991-92. Morena district  in Madhya Pradesh was the first to be
completed as a pilot project in 1992. In spite of methodological  limitations,  a recent evaluation report of
COLR in Morena (Sinha, 1998)  concludes  that the programme  has:
*  increased  flow of information  to the public through improved  access to records and an increased  awareness
of their rights, although  this benefit  has accrued more to those situated near district or tehsil headquarters;
*  led to the emergence  of the data-entry  operator as a new rent-seeking  agent;
*  been responsible for only a marginal reduction  in the workload of the patwaris (revenue inspectors);
*  failed to reduce the rent-seeking behaviour  of patwaris because they perform numerous functions besides
providing copies of the ROR that are unaffected by computerisation  of land records, and because people
are loathe to deny the RI (for possible favours in the future) what has now come  to be regarded as his due
share;
a  not resulted in better implementation  of land reforms;
*  not led to any significant improvements  in land record management;
*  so far failed to facilitate land transfers; and
*  not led to any appreciable  reduction  in land disputes.
It should not be concluded from these findings that the computerisation  of land records is ultimately likely to
prove unsuccessful. Programme acceptance  by all levels of the administration  through increased utilisation of
the database  could increase its uptake in the future and increase effectiveness. The evaluation  also suggests
that the supply of computerised  land records should be accompanied  by a demand for the records from the
farmers.
This is likely to happen only when members of the public are aware of their rights, know how to access
informnation,  and know how to press their claims.  Under an initiative  of the current Revenue Secretary, a
'User's Manual on Revenue Laws and Rights in Land' has been prepared in Oriya language in order to raise
such awareness among land users. It is designed to be user-friendly  and to provide simple information  in a
'Frequently Asked Questions' (FAQ) format, and will be distributed  at a low price (about Rs. 10 per copy)
through revenue offices, local panchayats, etc. About 25,000 copies are likely to be produced in the first
instance.
Inefficiencies  in land records management stem from a combination  of factors, only some of which
computerisation  is likely to help address.  For example, it cannot reduce inaccuracies in the initial recording of
interests in land. The now almost negligible  contribution  of land revenue to the state budget seems to have
contributed  to the perception that it is not important  to maintain  accurate land records. While revenue
inspectors  continue to collect primary data and to represent the cutting edge of land administration,  there has
been no addition to the local revenue staff (revenue inspectors,  clerks, etc.) to cope with the increase in the
volume of work arising from the natural  increases in population and land transactions, and no new investment
in infrastructure or staff  training. Recent years have also witnessed a rapid increase in development  work
(such as digging bore-wells, installing  bio-gas plants, meeting adult literacy targets, etc.) which is often
handled by the revenue staff. Taken together,  these factors combine  to over-burden  the lower levels of the
37revenue administration  and results in an inefficient  land record management system fraught by excessive
delays and high potential for rent-seeking. It is therefore important  to examine the working conditions and
workload of RIs to identify areas  for improved effectiveness.
Over the years the scope of Rls' operations has increased  both in terms of the area covered and the number of
tasks performed. On average, an RI circle in Orissa now covers  20-30 villages 28 with an annual revenue
demand of about Rs. 200,000. This is nearly 10 times the figure prescribed in the 1961 'Manual of Tehsil
Accounts'  in which an RI circle was envisaged  to have a revenue demand of Rs. 20-25,000 and a tehsil was to
cover an area with revenue demand of Rs. 300,000 (Tripathy, 1992). The conference of state revenue
secretaries in 1985 agreed that 'the areal jurisdiction of the [RI] should be brought down to a manageable level
such as four villages or 3000 khatiyans per [RI]' (GOI, 1985: 53). At the same conference,  the revenue
minister of Orissa acknowledged  that 'revenue administration  [in the state] is weak' (p. 15) and needs to be
revamped.
The RI's primary function is collection of land revenue and maintaining  land records. But he is also
responsible  for a variety of other  tasks. These tasks are grouped into four broad categories  in Table 8, which
also indicates  the proportion of the RI's total working time likely to be devoted to each category, according to
the perceptions of the Rls interviewed. It is evident that computerisation  is unlikely to reduce the time spent
by RIs on the collection of land revenue and other dues, miscellaneous  enquiries, issuing certificates or
attending courts. Computerisation  will, however, enable the RIs to concentrate  on important  matters such as
timely submission  of reports for disposal of cases, field visits, and correction of records.
While COLR is a positive development  it should not be regarded as a panacea for improving land
administration.  Its impact will only be maximised when:
*  it is accompanied by rationalisation  of the RI's workload  and of the procedures of revenue administration.
It may be appropriate  to hire a management consultancy  firm to undertake a systematic work-study of the
RI.  The terms of reference  for such a study could include an assessment  of the training needs and avenues
for promotion of Rls and tehsildars,  and decentralisation  of some of the tasks;
*  it becomes  more widely used and different government  departments  use it to transfer information and
databases. A computer link, for example, between  the sub-registrar's office and the tehsil headquarters
would be of considerable  benefit  to agents transacting in land.
It is clear that the computerisation  of land records and the computerisation  of the land registration system have
to be undertaken simultaneously  and effectively  coordinated for transaction costs to be significantly reduced.
A proposal  to computerise  the registration system in Orissa and integrate  it 'backwards' into land records
management has been recently been sanctioned  by the state government  (see Box 9).
28 This  is only  an average;  for example,  there  are 70 villages  within  Begunia  RI circle,  Khurda  district.
38Table 8:  Scope of responsibilities  of Revenue Inspectors
Collection  of dues  ti4=  Issue  certificates,  Respond  to
*1  ~~attend  courts  miscellaneous  enquiries
attendecourts  from  the Tehsildar
40%  25%  10%  25%
December  to March  and  ,  l  The  RI is expected  to  The  RI is responsible  for
June, is the collection  1~s,~~i'  1e~  s  provide information  to  sending  reports to the
season  in  which  the RI  l  concerned  departments  Tehsildar  on:
camnps  in particular  on:  . ceiling surplus cases
villages. In spite of  *  income,  under the Orissa Land
focusing on the post-  0  ~  solvency,  Reforms Act,
harvest season  when  *  caste status,  *  mutation  cases where
collection  is likely  to  be  a  . - nationality,  fraction  plots  are
easy,  annual  arrears  is  l  . *  residence,  involved,
around  15%.  Half  of the  &. legal  heir, u  encroachment  cases,
amount  is usually  property  valuation,  lease  of goverment
pending for more  than 3  ~  o~i~n>  and  lands,
years.  *  professional  status  *  property statements  for
to relevant departments  execution  of attachment
of sa*rd  ~for  issue of certificates  warrants in Certificate
~.~,..-'to  people within the RI  cases***,
2111 |  | circle.  *  fire  accidents,  and
y~i~ The  RI also attends  *naulhzrd
'7revenue  or civil courts as
and when  necessary.
Sairat sources are those that are auctioned e.g. tanks, mines, etc.
* Siha  refers  to the ledger  of petty  cash. Sadar  siha  is the ledger  maintained  for  urban  areas.
***  Certificate cases relate to late payment of dues.
The shaded portion suggests the tasks which might benefit from computerisation  of land records
Source: Compiled from field notes.
39Box 9:  Computer-aided  Registration  Administration  System (CRAS)
The present registration system is manual and dependent upon age-old methods and procedures. The
increasing volume of transactions has led to inordinate  delays and inefficiencies. Further, documents  are
subject to decay and the retrieval of documents  is laborious  and prone to delays. At the same time, valuation
of property, essential  to confirm that the sale price is not below the prevailing market price, takes a great deal
of time in manually searching  through the previous three years' records to find the highest value.
On the initiative of the Orissa Revenue  Department,  the state unit of the National Informatics  Centre was
contracted to develop a proposal for the computerisation  of the registration  administration  system (CRAS) and
its backward  integration with land records computerisation.  CRAS is expected  to:
*  reduce scope for the manipulation of records, and the time required to complete registration;
*  eliminate the need for Form No.3, and thereby reduce delays, as information  pertaining  to land transaction
may be sent directly  to the tehsil computer;
*  enable the sub-registrar  to ascertain  the validity of the transaction at the time of registration, by linking to
the tehsil computer, thereby reducing  subsequent  delays and unnecessary  costs; and
*  assist the tehsildar at the time of mutation to ascertain relevant facts directly  by means of a link to the sub-
registrar's computer  for speedier disposal of mutation cases and updating of RORs.
Source: Natinal  Informatics  Centre, 1998
4.1.4  Will reduced  transaction  costs facilitate  land sales and increase access to land by rural  poor?
To address these questions, we first need to examine the functioning  of the rural land market. Why do farm
households  buy or sell land? And, who buys and who sells?
It is conventionally assumed  that the full specification  and documentation (in the form of assured title) of
private rights in land will eliminate risks and uncertainty  in land rights and will lead to an active land market.
However, a characteristic  feature of the rural land market in Orissa, and elsewhere in India, is that the demand
for land far exceeds its supply. This is usually because land ownership  is one of the principal sources of
livelihood  security in the villages. No one wants to sell land unless forced to, since
'land prices do not fully compensate  for the high risks in parting with this secure asset as evaluated by
the farmer. In the absence of integrated  financial markets,  the transaction costs of investing the sales
proceeds in alternative ventures is also far too high. Besides, the externalities  of landownership in
terms of social status and credit collateral  for the owner may not be fully reflected in the land prices in
the market.' (Bardhan, 1984: 95)
Land ownership is also a major source of prestige and social status. It is estimated that in urban areas of
Orissa, nearly 300,000 household heads, mostly employed by the government,  each own more than three acres
of land in their natal villages. They hold on to their holdings as absentee landlords for prestige 2 9. Until
recently, status in urban areas was usually derived not so much from the size of one's village holding, but from
the fact that 'food (grain) comes from my village land.'
29 Member, Board of Revenue, Cuttack,  personal comm.
40A recent study on the operation of land markets in a village in Sambalpur  revealed that about 70 percent of
land sales over the 40-year period 1955-95  were distress sales, i.e. for consumption  and debt repayment,
medical or marriage purposes, which are highly inelastic  (Sarap, 1998). Land sale for investment purposes
accounted for between 20 and 33 percent of all transactions  for marginal, small and medium farmers, but for
nearly half of the land sale transactions  of large farmers30. The investment expenditure  of the former group
was found to represent a form of distress diversification  into low productivity,  non-farm enterprises 31 which
required small amounts of working capital. The large farmers, on the other hand, invested the proceeds from
the sale of land in purchase of commercial  vehicles, building  construction, financing  higher education,  and
finding  jobs for their children.
The research also showed that large farmers:
*  purchased a larger area of land per transaction compared with other size classes  of farmers, suggesting  that
they enjoyed more ready access to credit;
*  often purchased  productive land in the village, or plots situated near their present landholdings;  and
*  purchased land from everyone - from other large farmers as well as from medium, small and marginal
farmers.
Swain (1998) reported similar findings on the operation of the land market from a comparative study of an
agriculturally advanced  and irrigated village in Cuttack district  and an agriculturally  backward  village in
Dhenkanal district. All land transactions  bar one in the advanced  village were for distress purposes:
consumption,  marriage, loan repayment,  replacement  of dead bullocks, and funerals. One farmer sold off his
unirrigated holding to buy an irrigated plot. In the agriculturally  backward village,  two out of every three land
sale transactions  were for meeting the expense of a daughter's wedding.
These findings suggest that the land market  is underdeveloped  and sluggish  across different parts of Orissa. It
is mostly driven by distress sales, as farmers  are unwilling  to part with their plots of land under normal
conditions.  And, it is the large farmers  who are the dominant  players in the land market, buying productive and
better located lands and consolidating  their holdings.
Discussion in this section suggests a general 'Principle  of Joint Requirements'  (Lipton, 1998:  4), if access to
land for the rural poor is to be enhanced  through the market. It seems that lowering the costs of transacting in
the land sale market alone may be unable to induce land sales, unless several requirements  are met  jointly. The
total rate payable for stamp duty and registration  fees must be reduced. Land records and the registration
system need urgently to be computerised  and the two systems integrated.  The revenue inspector's workload
requires a measure of rationalisation. But these steps will have to be accompanied  by a number of additional
measures. Imperfections in the credit market need to be removed. Non-farm employment  and investment
opportunities  need to be increased. And there will also have to be improved access to education,  health and
skill formation, if reduced transaction costs are to facilitate  land sales and lead to improved access to land by
the rural poor.
As first steps, GOO should focus on rationalising  rate of stamp duty, coordinating  the computerisation  of land
records and registration, and rationalising  revenue inspectors' workload. These may not immediately
encourage new sellers to enter the land market, but at least the existing transactors  would be spared
considerable  hardship and harassment.
30 Marginal:  less  than I acre,  Small:  I -2.5 acres,  Medium:  2.51  - 5 acres,  and  Large:  above  5 acres.
31 E.g.  small  vegetable  shops  (in a portion  of the house),  paddy  husking,  or spices  and  vegetable  marketing.
414.2.  Land fragmentation
Agricultural  holdings do not normally comprise  a single compact block but are made up of a number of parcels
scattered across  the village. The fragmentation 32 of operational  holdings into multiple plots is commonly
perceived to be a serious constraint on agricultural  productivity. High direct and opportunity costs in
cultivation are frequently ascribed  to fragmentation,  including:  the time and energy expended in moving labor,
draft animals, seed, manure and irrigation water from one plot to another, and bringing harvested crops to a
common  point; supervision  of labor; increased  expenses of irrigation and drainage; difficulty of access to
scattered plots; and loss of land in boundaries  (Mearns 1998).
State governments  have attempted to control fragmentation  through legislative  means and by encouraging land
consolidation,  or making it compulsory.  This section examines  the extent of fragmentation  in Orissa, legal
provisions  to control it, and progress achieved and problems  encountered  in the administrative  process of land
consolidation.
4.2.1  Extent offragmentation
There is widespread consensus  that the rate of fragmnentation  of land holdings in Orissa is very high, though
the evidence is patchy. This is because  there is no systematic  compilation  of data within the state on the
number of parcels per operational  holding. These data is collected  at the time of consolidation operations, and
may even be sent to the Director, Consolidation  at Cuttack. But they are rarely aggregated so as to form a
comprehensive  view of the extent of fragmentation,  regional variation, or of the relative success of
consolidation. Thus, much of this discussion  is based on village studies, National Sample Survey (NSS) data,
and informed estimates.
The trend in fragmentation  over time and across land sizes is shown in Table 9. In 1961-62  there were an
average of 6.4 fragments (or parcels) per operational  holding across all size classes. By 1981-82, this had
fallen to 5 parcels per holding. The average area per parcel has also declined during this period, though
marginally, from 0.31 to 0.29 ha. It is evident that the rate of fragmentation  is higher in medium and large
holdings.
In the absence of more disaggregated  data, it is difficult  to form an accurate  view of regional variation in
fragmentation.  Knowledgeable sources claim that fragmentation  is a more serious problem in irrigated and
coastal areas than in western Orissa. However, and we discuss below, there is considerable  resistance to land
consolidation in western Orissa.
32 Fragmentation  is defined  as the number  of non-contiguous  plots  per operational  or ownership  holding  within  a village.
42Table 9:  Land fragmentation  in Orissa by operational  holding size
Size of operational  1961-62  1981-82
holding (ha)
No. of parcels  per  Average area per  No. of parcels  per  Average area per
holding  parcel (ha)  holding  parcel (ha)
0.00  1.56
0.002-0.20  2.19  0.03  1.28  0.05
0.21-0.40  3.52  0.08  3.98  0.07
0.41-1.00  4.60  0.14  4.53  0.15
1.01-2.02  6.08  0.23  6.24  0.24
2.03-3.03  8.32  0.28  6.66  0.37
3.04-4.04  9.92  0.34  7.17  0.48
4.05-5.05  10.64  0.42  7.58  0.59
5.06-6.07  9.91  0.53  9.10  0.60
6.08-8.09  12.59  0.53  9.19  0.72
8.10-10.12  11.08  0.80  9.23  0.96
10.13-12.14  15.46  0.65  15.24  0.70
12.15-20.24  10.58  1.53  8.50  1.67
20.25 and above  8.30  2.78  6.51  8.04
All  sizes  6.39  0.31  5.02  0.29
Source: Compiled from Thangaraj  (1995).
4.2.2  Legal provisions and progress of land consolidation  in Orissa
Consolidation  of land holdings is designed  to reverse fragmentation  through a scheme of redistribution of
lands in compact rectangular  blocks 3 3. The Orissa Consolidation  of Holdings and Prevention  of
Fragmentation  of Land (OCH & PFL) Act, 1972 aims to provide a compact parcel of agricultural land to the
cultivator in lieu of his scattered plots. In this scheme, the fragmented  patches of landowners are brought
under one, two or three chaks and the right, title and interest of a landowner is decided in the preparation of
ROR and village map. Simultaneously,  a separate category  of land is reserved for communal and
developmental  purposes of the village. The Act also aims to set aside land for drainage  canals in irrigated
villages while in unirrigated  villages, farmers  are encouraged  to utilise groundwater  resources.
Tables 10 and 11 provide an indication of the progress of land consolidation  operations in Orissa since 1974
when the OCH & PFL Act was operationalised.  These data suggest that land consolidation  has so far been
completed  on only 17 percent of the total operated area in Orissa. Some 1  1 percent of this total was
consolidated  over the period 1995-98  at a cost of Rs. 626 million (Table 11), or around  Rs. 6,000 per hectare.
However, these official data must be interpreted  with caution owing to wide variations in actual
implementation  across the state. Efforts to consolidate land holdings in western Orissa, in particular, appear to
have unsuccessful (see section 4.2.4). While the process may be have been 'completed', in the sense that
consolidation  officers have processed the necessary paperwork and filed reports under the OCH & PFL Act,
little change may actually have taken place on the ground as farmers frequently refuse to exchange plots or
alter existing plot boundaries.
33 While  some  regard  land  consolidation  to be a potentially  important  component  of India's  land  reforms  (e.g.  Oldenburg
1990),  others  argue  that land  consolidation  does  not constitute  land  reform  on  the grounds  that  it usually  attempts
scrupulously  to ensure  that land  distribution  remains  unchanged.
43Table  10:  Progress  of land consolidation  in Orissa, 1974-98
Status  Number of  Share of total no.  Area (ha)  Share of total
villages  villages in Orissa  operated  area in
(%)  Orissa (%)
Excluded  from  consolidation  u/s  686  (6.9)  1.3  132,318  (8.1)  2.5
5(1)
Updating  of records  and  426  (4.3)  0.8  101,281  (6.2)  1.9
publication  u/s 13 (4)
Completion  of consolidation  6992  (70.5)  13.7  918,020  (56.6)  17.3
operation  and  publication  of ROR
and  Maps  u/s 22(2)
Consolidation  operation  yet to  1817  (18.3)  3.6  471,594  (29.1)  8.9
start
Total  (i.e. issue  of notification  u/s  9921  (100.0)  19.4  1,623,213  (100.0)  30.6
3(1))
Note:  Figures in parentheses are percentages  of the total
Source: Director (Consolidation),  Board of Revenue, Cuttack
Table  11:  Progress  and expenditure  in land consolidation  in Orissa, 1995-98
1995-6  1996-7  1997-8  Total
Progress  u/s 22(2)  No. of villages  184  257  213  654
Area  (ha)  22,414  40,725  36,735  99,874
Progress  u/s 13(4)  No. of villages  11  28  74  113
Area  (ha)  3,803  8,990  14,784  27,577
Total  expenditure  18.67  21.33  22.61  62.61
(in Rs. Crore,  at
current  prices)
Source: Director (Consolidation),  Board of Revenue, Cuttack
4.2.3  Process of consolidation
The land consolidation  process is designed to amalgamate  plots into consolidated  blocks while maintaining
more or less constant land distribution  within the village, and taking into account broad variations in land
quality. The selection of villages for consolidation  and broad operational  procedure is as follows:
Village selection  and local representation:  Under the OCH & PFL Act, a consolidation  operation  may be
taken up only in those villages in which a minimum  of 70 percent of all landowners  agree to consolidation.  In
addition, it is required that at least 25 percent of owners should have more than 3-4 plots per holding. If these
two conditions are met then the village is said to be 'consolidable'. The Act also provides for a Consolidation
Committee to be formed in the village to ensure local participation  in the consolidation operation. The
committee should comprise 7-15 members representing  all land holding size classes, plus one landless person
44and one member each from the scheduled castes and scheduled  tribes3 4. An advisory committee is also to be
formed at the range-level  to ensure  the smooth implementation  of the programme,  and should include the local
MLA.
At the outset, government  consolidation officers  hold meetings  with landowners  to explain the potential
benefits of land consolidation,  the main provisions  of the OCH & PFL Act, and the manner in which their
interests shall be represented. Villagers are then called upon to nomini-e the names of people for the
committee. In practice, there tends to be extensive  public  involvement in the plains and coastal areas in which
a high proportion of the operated area is irrigated, but much less involvement  or commitment  in the hilly tracts
of western Orissa.
Survey and correction of existing  RORs: Consolidation  is carried  out within the circle of a particular police
station. Eventually all villages within the circle are covered. The first step is to conduct a plot-to-plot survey of
the village area (similar to the process followed in a survey and settlement operation),  beginning in the north-
west corner of each village and ending in the south-east  corner. The existing  RORs are then updated.
Following the initial survey, if it is determined  that there is too little cultivable land to make land consolidation
worthwhile,  the operation  does not proceed further (i.e. these villages are placed under section 13(4)  of the
Act).
Consolidation  of holdings: There are two alternative  processes of consolidation,  depending on the type of
terrain: (i) rectangulation,  where the entire area to be consolidated  is flat and irrigated (as in parts of Ganjam
district); and (ii) amalgamation,  where there is undulating  terrain (as in Khurda and Sambalpur  districts).
Under the amalgamation  process,  the model pioneered in Uttar Pradesh is adopted, in which relative scores are
awarded to plots on land of differing  quality, subject to agreement  among members of the local consolidation
committee (Oldenburg 1990).  In this process,  the land that is locally agreed to be of highest quality is given a
score of 100  and declared the 'standard plot'. The relative  value of all other land is assessed in relation to this
standard plot, and awarded proportionately  lower scores. Each landowner's total holding is then calculated as a
weighted area; the weightings determined  by the relative scores  allocated  to land of each type.
Following the assessment of the value of each landowner's original holding, the consolidation officers draw up
proposals for plot reallocation and amalgamation.  The entitlements  of individual landowners  are decided by
'sector' (normally following natural boundaries  within the village). For example, if a farmer originally holds
plots in five sectors, his or her claim is eliminated from the two sectors in which s/he has the least land. The
aim is that each landowner should end up with a holding of a weighted area within +/- 33 percent of the
original weighted holding size, but the new holding should be made up of not more than three individual  plots.
At this stage, land is also set side for communal use (roads, canals, etc).
Finally, provided there is local agreement,  land holdings are reallocated, and the revised RORs and village
maps prepared in accordance  with the agreed scheme. The OCH & PFL Act specifies  a minimum period of 27
months for the completion  of land consolidation in a given village, although it normally  takes much longer. It
takes about five years to consolidate land in all villages within one police station circle.
4.2.4  Failure of consolidation in Sambalpur
In order to gain further insights into the manner in which land consolidation is conducted in practice, and with
what consequences, we conducted a short field investigation  in several villages of Sambalpur  district. On
34 Note  that  this  level  of representation  is lower  than  the proportionate  share  of the total  population  accounted  for by
people  of scheduled  castes  and  tribes  (16  and  22 percent  respectively).
45average, there are about 7.5 plots per holding in 93 villages in the four tehsils for which data was made
available. The averages  mask wide variations in the extent of 'scatteredness', however. In Talab village of
Rengali tehsil, for example, there were 14.5 plots per holding prior to the start of the land consolidation
operation.
A total of 146 villages falling under six police stations  were taken up for consolidation  after the promulgation
of the OCH & PFL Act, 1972. One village failed to satisfy the minimum conditions  for consolidation to
proceed, and landowners  in a further eight villages failed to cooperate  with the proposals for land reallocation
following the preparation and publication  of the land register.  As a result, consolidation operation in these 8
villages had to be called off. At the time of our survey, land consolidation  had been completed in 134 of the
remaining 137 villages, and is ongoing in three villages.
Of the 134  villages in which the operation  had been completed and  pattas distributed,  however, landowners in
47 villages (35 percent) have refused to take possession of the new holdings,  since they are unwilling to
undertake the large-scale  exchange  of plots that would be required to effect the consolidation  process. Some of
these villages are located at the tail-end of the Hirakud irrigation system  where there is considerable
fluctuation  in water availability.  It appears  that landowners  do not have confidence in the way the proposals
were prepared in practice, and fear that the method adopted  has not adequately  taken account of variations in
land quality  (see Box 10 for a more detailed village case study). In spite of the undulating terrain and widely
varying soil types, 75 percent of landowners have been allotted land in a single compact block (chak), and 20
percent in  just two chaks. Only five percent households  have been allotted land in three chaks. Diversification
of holdings across land types is regarded  by local farmers as essential under the prevailing  cropping systems. It
is suggested by informed observers that such conditions,  accounting for much of the local resistance to land
consolidation,  are typical of the hilly tracts of westem Orissa.
4.2.5  Resistance to consolidation
In summary, resistance to consolidation  may arise from:
*  predominance ofpaddy:  In undulating  tracts, paddy is grown on terraced fields which need to be flat and
require a bund to retain water. It is obviously easier to level and maintain  smaller plots than one large
fragment.  Further, given the labour-intensive  nature of paddy cultivation,  the farming efficiency of small
fields can be high, given the low opportunity  cost of family labour in circumstances of limited non-farm
employment  potential;
*  variability in soil types: As the case study from Sambalpur  highlights,  there can be a sizeable variation in
output per plot due to soil quality and farmers with plots in fertile and well-drained soils are reluctant to
exchange  them for fewer fragments  on poorer soils;
*  need to spread labour:  Diversification  between plots reduce peaks in labour demand throughout the year,
on the expectation  that crops in different plots may be at different stages in the cropping cycle at any given
time. This explanation is less plausible where cropping cycles vary little between plots, and with use of
modem seed varieties and irrigation;
*  risk aversion: This seems a valid reason for persistence  of fragmentation  in unirrigated tracts where
different soils have different moisture-retention  capacities.  Holding a diversified portfolio  of land parcels
can enable  the farner to minimise  the risk of low yields in the worst years;
46Box 10: 'We do not intend to move':
resistance  to land consolidation  in Laderpally  village, Sambalpur
The resistance to land consolidation  that arises in villages of extreme heterogeneity  in land quality are
exemplified  by the experience  of farmers in Laderpally  village, in formerly  undivided Sambalpur district.
Land here is rocky and undulating  and initial holdings  were highly fragmented.  Soils are generally deficient  in
nitrogen  and phosphate. Cultivated  land is classified  locally into the following  five categories, in ascending
order of fertility:
Land category  Local name  Share of area (°/)  Preferred crop
Ridges  att  38  groundnuts  or minor pulses
Slopes  mal  34  paddy
Dales  berna  14  paddy
Lowland  bahal  12  paddy
Fertile land  barchha  2  paddy
Given the undulating nature of the terrain, consolidation  was attempted by means of the arnalgamation
method. The bahal land was taken as the 'standard plot', and given a score of 1.00. Relative to this, berna and
mal lands were rated 0.75 and 0.50 respectively.
Consider the case of Keshu Pradhan, a semi-medium  farmer. Before consolidation,  he owned 6.36 acres in 14
individual plots. After consolidation his total holding increased  to 6.9 acres, now distributed over three plots.
While the weighted area of Keshu's holding  declined from 5.06 to 4.70 acres, this remains within the +/- 33
percent range of variation allowable (see Table 12).
However, Keshu Pradhan (and many others like him) is unhappy with the consolidation process since it has
resulted in his losing almost 60 percent of his valuable bahal land. Bahal land is particularly  valued because it
requires lower labour inputs in paddy production  than does mal land. For example, a single person can operate
a tractor on the wetter bahal land, while mal land requires additional labour, particularly  in summer when the
mal lands dry up. At the same time, productivity  of paddy on mal land is almost half that on bahal land. Keshu
estimates that while his labour inputs will need to increase by about 20 percent, output will decline by almost
one-third, and concludes that 'consolidation will not benefit us.'
Land consolidation  has also reduced Keshu Pradhan's options in the event of contingencies. With land held in
only three discrete plots, he is now unable to lease-out  a small, distant plot, or sell or mortgage one of a
number of small plots in the event of an emergency. One of Keshu's daughters is now of marriageable age and
he anticipates the need to raise money to meet the wedding expenses  in the near future. He had hoped to sell
one of his former small plots for that purpose. As Keshu explains,
'They  [consolidation  officials]  do not understand  the problems  they  create.  They  are  only  interested  in  targets  and in
keeping  the standard  plot  ratio  [the  weighted  average]  within  [the  prescribed]  limits. It creates  many  problems  for
families  who  have  to move  out of productive  lands  to unproductive  areas. Nobody  is happy  with  the consolidation  here
and  we do not intend  to move.!
The resistance to moving to consolidated  holdings is owed to more than an emotional  attachment to ancestral
property. Given current prices of different  types of land, Keshu stands to lose about four percent of the value
of his total holding. He also anticipates  that over the next 5-10 years the value of bahal land is likely to
appreciate much more than that of the other two types of land: 'I do not want to lose in the future'.
47Table  12:  Impact of land consolidation  on one holding, Sambalpur  district
Land  Relative  Approx  Before Consolidation  After Consolidation
Category  Weighting  price
(Rs. Per
acre)
Area  No. of  Imputed  Area  No. of  Imputed
(acres)  plots  value of  (acres)  plots  value of
holding (Rs.)  holding (Rs.)
Bahal  1.00  80,000  3.00  3  240,000  1.25  1  100,000
Berna  0.75  60,000  1.50  3  90,000  2.50  1  150,000
Mal  0.50  50,000  1.86  8  93,000  3.15  1  157,500
Total  6.36  14  423,000  6.90  3  407,500
Weighted  5.055  4.70
total
Source: Field notes, Laderpally village.
*  information asymmetries  and transaction costs: A possible reason for the infrequency of voluntary
exchange of land parcels between farmers may be the lack of necessary information  about the potential
productivity of each other's land. However, this seems unlikely in villages where there can be few secrets.
It seems more plausible that farmers may be unable to agree on the exchange value of fragments in the
context of thin land markets. Uncertainty  surrounding  its legal status and the high cost of obtaining  pattas
may also discourage  potential  transactors.
*  need to hold land as a liquid asset: Land enters the sale market infrequently  and in small fragments.
Landowners will be unwilling to consolidate  their land parcels as this might preclude the option of
selling/mortgaging  a small piece of land in order to meet future contingencies  (e.g. marriage or funeral
costs). The discussion in Section  4.1.4 established  that most land sales are distress sales. Clearly,
consolidation  programs that seek to restrict resale also restrict the liquidity of land as an asset in the limited
portfolio available to cultivators (Heston and Kumar, 1983).
Of these, soil heterogeneity seems  to be the chief constraint on land consolidation  in the north-western  plateau
of Orissa, and risk aversion in unirrigated regions. While high transaction costs in land markets also act as a
disincentive  to voluntary consolidation (i.e. the voluntary exchange  of plots), the importance  of holding land as
a liquid asset, in the absence of other durable assets or steady income-streams,  is a critical factor in explaining
the widespread resistance to land consolidation  in practice.
4.2.6  Policy issues
Land consolidation,  where it may successfully  be implemented,  is more likely to contribute  positively to
agricultural  productivity than to improving  access to land for the poor. In theory, consolidation ought not
change net land distribution, and so should not leave the poor worse off. Our findings in Orissa suggest that
land consolidation, like land survey and settlement  operations,  actually tends to worsen land distribution at the
bottom end, to the extent that it has brought about any real change on the ground. While land consolidation
may contribute positively to agricultural  productivity  under certain conditions,  it will not help increase access
to land for the rural poor unless attention  is also paid to other aspects of a land reform agenda. For instance,
insecure  tenants and share-croppers  whose names do not appear in land records may lose their rights in land, if
consolidation is pushed through without first securing  their rights.
48Moreover, under existing  practices of partible  inheritance,  land consolidation  can only ever be a temporary,
or stop-gap solution  to the problems attributed  to land fragmentation,  since  the gains achieve will be eroded
over time with the subdivision of holdings  upon inheritance.
4.3  Land encroachment
One way in which the rural poor and other socially excluded  groups compensate for their lack of access to and
control over privately owned arable land is through access to common and public land (Meams, 1998). Of
course, non-poor and larger landowners  also seek to increase  their effective landholding  by occupying
common land. Commons in Orissa amount to around 20 percent of the total area of the state, including  (see
Table 1):
*  'barren and uncultivable wastelands' (3 percent of total area) which are set aside for public or communal
purposes and are not generally liable for revenue;
*  'cultivable wastelands' (peromboke, 3 percent area) which have been cultivated in the past but have been
left uncultivated and subsequently  purchased  or otherwise acquired  by the government;
*  'permanent pasture and other grazing lands' (gochar, 4 percent area); and
*  village forests (9 percent area).
The first three categories are revenue lands and the last is owned by the Forest Department.  All four categories
fall within village boundaries and are also known as village lands. The land revenue department  classifies
village lands into 'non-objectionable' and 'objectionable' lands. Only government-owned  cultivable
wastelands constitute 'non-objectionable' land, which may be granted to landless households  as described
below. The 'objectionable lands' include gochars, cemeteries,  village roads, all forest lands, tanks, tank beds,
and river embankments.  None of these lands should be encroached  upon for settlement or cultivation. The
reality, however, is very different.
Land encroachment  is the result of:
- loopholes in land reform legislation: The Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1952  was biased in favour of
estate owners as it allowed  them to keep 33 acres for personal cultivation.  All tenants on the  'resumable'
area of each estate were evicted for fear that they would otherwise  acquire ownership rights to the land.
The Orissa Tenant Protection Act, 1948 and the Tenant Relief Act, 1955,  while seeking to protect tenants
from unlawful eviction, could not be enforced adequately  owing  to the absence or manipulation of land
records. Evicted tenants were thus compelled  to eke out an existence by encroaching  on government  or
common lands;
*  displacement as a result of development  activities: Inadequate attention  tends to be paid to resettlement
and rehabilitation  of people displaced by large development  projects (dams, irrigation  schemes, mining
operations, etc.) (see Box 11). To the extent that displaced  communities  are resettled at all, they are
frequently allocated  remote land of poor quality. Consequently,  displaced  people tend to encroach,
illegally,  on nearby government  land;
*  lax implementation  of existing  land laws by revenue officials: For instance,  those who encroach on
government  land are required  to be 'booked' by the revenue inspector (RI) and have proceedings initiated
to evict them. However, encroachment  represents  an opportunity  for rent-seeking by revenue officials.
Instances of encroachment on public and common land are overlooked, in return for a suitable
consideration,  usually payable annually.  This practice clearly encourages  encroachment  in the long-run,
and favours larger landowners  who are most able to pay the requisite  bribes;
49*  increasingpressure on land: Orissa's population, growing  at an annual rate of 2 percent, continues to
depend substantially  on agriculture  for their livelihoods.  The 'cultivable land' frontier is therefore being
pushed progressively further  onto government  and common land.
4.3.1  Typology and extent of encroachment
In Orissa, all types of common land are under threat of encroachment. In private discussions,  government
officials freely acknowledge the widespread encroachment  of government  land, but official data is either not
gathered or not readily forthcoming.  For example, survey and settlement operations  do not recognise claims
established  through encroachment. The reason for this is to preserve original rights in land, but the opportunity
is missed  to acquire more reliable aggregate  data on the extent and forms of encroachment. An encroachment
register is maintained at tehsil level, for purposes of proceeding  with eviction cases from government  land.
Owing to the incentives  for rent-seeking at this level, these data must be regarded as highly suspect. They are
not, in any case, aggregated at any higher level, although in principle some monitoring  of encroachment  is
carried out at district level.
Who encroaches on what types of land? Table 13 summarises  the current status of encroachment  on different
types of public and common land. An important  type of interaction  between the state and the land user is the
de facto 'privatisation' of common lands through encroachment.  Successful  encroachment  of peromboke lands
and other common lands (such as uncultivated  wastelands)  depends upon the degree of influence  the
individual encroacher  enjoys, both with regard to other villagers and to government  revenue department
officials. Individuals  of widely differing  socio-economic  status encroach upon  peromboke land. Landless and
near-landless  households  are perhaps the most numerous, but their position is vulnerable to better-off and
relatively  more powerful  groups who are able to employ intimidatory  tactics to evict them. Those with a
greater degree of influence may be in a position  to see that weaker groups are evicted,  yet also manage to
evade the law themselves through bribery  to allow their encroachment  on public and common  land to go
unnoticed, and eventually  to have the encroached land registered in their own names. A lengthy process of de
facto occupation ofperomboke land and payment of annual fines for encroachment  may thus eventually lead
to a change in the revenue classification  of the land and acquisition  of legal title. Revenue  records inevitably
lag significantly  behind the true extent of encroachment  at any given moment.
From our field investigations,  it appears that opportunities  for further encroachment  are now generally limited.
Local revenue records and discussions with Rls and tehsildars reveal that most of the encroachment  takes
place on land designated as peromboke, cultivable waste, permanent pastures and other grazing lands, and only
to a very limited extent on land under the jurisdiction of the forest department.  Focus group discussions with
50Box 11: How development  can reduce  access to land
Until 1981, coal mining companies  could acquire substantial  tracts of land with few restrictions  under the Coal
Bearing Areas Act. Under an agreement  reached in 1981  between GOO and the coal companies, land is now
required  to be acquired by the Revenue  Department  at market  rates (under the Land Acquisition Act) and each
displaced family is to be assured of one permanent  job in the mines.
Two major obstacles have frustrated  the original intentions of this agreement:
*  the definition of family': households often consist  of extended families with several adult members. Only
one will be found a job although  all are displaced.
*  inadequate  land records: since land claims may not be accurately established  in land records, intra-family
struggles may ensue to establish  a claim to the single job offered in compensation.  All other household
members are forced to seek alternative livelihoods.
The loss of common land is generally not compensated  under this agreement,  which adversely affects the
landless. One study of people displaced  by the Upper Indravati  dam in Koraput district found that many of the
displaced were landless people dependent  upon podu (shifting cultivation)  on common lands (Mohapatra,
1983). Entitlement to government  compensation  rested upon private property rights only and ignored
customary rights in common  property.
villagers revealed that little usable common  grazing land remains.  Grazing commons  have either been
encroached upon or are so degraded that they are no longer  used for grazing and the animals are now stall-fed.
In the absence of more reliable data, it is difficult  to form an accurate  view of the socio-economic  status of
those who encroach on common land. A series of focus group discussions with land owners and landless
farmers in Laderpally village, Sambalpur  district, suggest that 90 percent of all who encroach on village land
in Laderpally own less than two hectares of private land. Medium and large farmers make up the remaining 10
percent. The estimated distribution  of encroachers  by size of class of existing land holding is as follows:
Landless  10%
Marginal (0-1 ha)  10%
Small (1-2 ha)  70%
Semi-medium (2-4 ha)  5%
Medium and Large (>4 ha)  5%
At least in Laderpally, much of the impetus  for encroachment  comes from small farmers, belonging to the
middle level of the village hierarchy. While poor, they are not the poorest, and while predominantly dependent
upon agriculture, it is not their only source of livelihood. There is evidence  that, having acquired some skills
and education, small-farmer  households  are beginning  to move into the service sector and rural non-farm
enterprises  (Sarap,  personal comm.). This upwards mobility provides them with the additional clout in the
village necessary  to displace poorer groups from common land, and the ability to influence lower-level  land
revenue officers  to their advantage.
51Table 13:  Encroachment  by land category
Ownership  Land category  Use Status  Means of  Whether  land transfer  Ground-level reality
status  (share of total  increasing  legally permissible
state land area)  private land
access
Barren/  Village Commons  Encroachment  Landless categories  can be settled  Extensively encroached  both by
Uncultivable  after being booked by RI; other  landowners and landless;
wasteland (3%)  categories  evicted  encroachers  rarely booked by RI;
widespread  rent-seeking
Government  Cultivable  Village Commons  Encroachment  Landless  categories  can be settled  Extensively encroached  both by
land  wasteland (3%)  after being booked by RI; other  landowners  and landless;
(Peromboke)  categories  evicted  encroachers  rarely booked by RI;
widespread  rent-seeking
Permanent  pastures  Village Commons  Encroachment  Private ownership not permitted  Extensively encroached  both by
and other grazing  landowners and landless;
lands (Gochar)  encroachers  rarely evicted;
(4%)  widespread  rent-seeking
Land owned  by  Private land most  Sale, exchange,  Permitted  though restrictions  on  Increasing  conversion of
non-tribals  commonly  used for  inheritance  converting  crop land for non-  agricultural land for non-
(area n/a)  cultivation, recent attempts  agricultural  purposes  agricultural uses
to convert  for non-
agricultural  purposes
Private land  Land owned  by  Private land for settled or  Sale, exchange,  Permitued  only among  the  Legislation ineffective  in
tribals  shifting  cultivation,  though  inheritance  scheduled  tribes and scheduled  controlling  tribal land alienation;
(area n/a)  decline  in latter  castes. Transfer  to non-tribals  permission from revenue  officials
only under exceptional  available at a 'price'
circumstances  and not without
permission  of revenue  authorities
524.3.2  Land alienationfrom tribal  groups
Orissa has a large tribal population  (22 percent of total population,  three times the average for India)
and tribal land alienation by moneylenders  has long been recognised  to be a critical issue. Tribal
people, with generally low educational  and skill levels and limited access to formal credit markets,
have had little option but to seek credit at high rates of interest from moneylenders.  In the event of
default on loan repayments,  moneylenders  have tended to appropriate first tribals' forest produce, and
later their land itself. This process has been reported in numerous village studies dating at least as far
back as Bailey's classic study of socio-economic  change in a western Orissa village since  the late 19th
century (Bailey, 1957).
Alienation of land held by members of Scheduled  Tribes (ST) has been restricted by legislation as a
matter of public policy. After Independence,  the Constitution  of India enabled state governments  to
make regulations  restricting alienation  of land by STs in Scheduled  Areas. In Orissa, Regulation 2
(1956) in Scheduled  Areas provides  that land held by a person belonging  to a scheduled  tribe cannot,
without permission of the appropriate authorities,  be alienated  to a person not belonging to a
scheduled tribe. The law also allows for a suo moto action by the Collector for restitution  of alienated
tribal lands. Section 22/23 of the OLRA applies to prevent land alienation  by tribals in non-scheduled
areas.
In practice,  however, land alienation remains prevalent if officially unacknowledged  (Fernandes et al.,
1988). When money is lent, the loan agreement  ensures that the moneylender  has rights over all the
produce for a certain number of years (usually nine). Since the borrower is therefore left without any
income, he is forced to keep borrowing,  thereby mortgaging  the produce of his land for many
subsequent  years. Rights to the produce of the land eventually accrue  to the moneylender for such a
long period that tribal land owner is reduced to the status of little more than a bonded labourer
producing crops for the moneylender,  on land that legally  remains his own. One study of four districts
(Dhenkanal,  Ganjam, Koraput and Phulbani) estimated  that about 56 percent of the total tribal land
was lost to non-tribals over a 25-30 year period through these means (Viegas, 1987). Of this total, 40
percent was lost through indebtedness  and land mortgage, 23 percent through encroachment, 17
percent as a result of displacement  by development  projects, 15 percent through personal sale, and the
balance due to floods and other natural calamities.
A less well-understood  pattern is the administrative  erosion of tribals' communal land rights through
survey and settlement  operations themselves.  In recent decades,  cadastral survey by the chain survey
method has gradually  given way to the plane-table  method to reduce operational  costs. But land with a
gradient greater than 10 percent cannot accurately  be surveyed  by the plane table method, and in
Orissa these unsurveyed lands have customarily  been lumped  together as 'uncultivable wasteland' in
the record-of-rights  in land (Roy Burman, 1987). The outcome  is catastrophic  for tribal groups. In a
1961 land survey and settlement  operation in Niyamgiri hills of south-western  Orissa, for example,
only 15 acres out of a total village area surveyed  of 2647 acres were declared to be 'cultivable land'
(Roy Burman, 1987). Only on this land was rent assessed and demanded of the 16 owners in the
village. One acre was recorded as grazing land, 7 acres  under housing, and only half an acre classified
as common land for the village graveyard.  The remaining  2624 acres, being of a gradient greater than
10 percent, were recorded as (state-owned)  'uncultivable wasteland'. In reality, much of this area was
owned by tribal households, and was cultivated in demarcated  plots on which fruit trees had been
planted.
Anecdotes abound concerning  the loss of tribal land to powerful interest groups and the lower levels
of the land revenue administration.  Even discounting a certain amount of exaggeration,  it is difficult to
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legislation  designed to prevent it. Clearly, legislation  alone is inadequate  to bring about social justice.
It needs to be accompanied  by socio-political  consciousness-raising  and awareness-building  among
tribal groups of the sort that is being undertaken  throughout Orissa by civil society organisations.  For
example, Gram Vikas, an NGO based in Berhampur, Ganjam district, has won several landslide legal
cases by hiring lawyers to act on behalf of tribal communities  in public-interest  litigation  to defend
their land rights.
4.3.3  Legalframework and how it operates
The central purpose of the Orissa Prevention  of Land Encroachment  (OPLE) Act, 1972 is to prevent
unauthorised  occupation of government  land. It is even-handed and clearly lays down penalties for all
instances of encroachment,  to be followed by eviction. Through  a 1982  amendment the state has
recognised  that there are different  types of encroachers  on different  types of lands (see Table 13).
While all encroachers are required  to be evicted from 'objectionable' lands, landless encroachers are
legally entitled to be settled on up to I standard acre per family of 'non-objectionable' land (i.e.
cultivable wasteland).
The eviction process proceeds as follows: (i) based on his enquiries, the RI files a report to the land
revenue (tehsildar's) court, and legal proceedings  are initiatied; (ii) the tehsildar issues notice to show
cause why penalty should not be imposed; (iii) encroacher shows such cause; (iv) if this cause is
admitted as valid, the mutation process is initiated for the issue of patta to the land; (v) if cause not
admitted as valid, notice is issued for imposition  of penalty and eviction within 30 days. The statutory
minimum  period for the entire process is three months, but in practice cases may take between six
months and a year to settle/ dispose of.
Steps (i) to (iii) in the above sequence are similar  for both landless and landowning  encroachers on
'unobjectionable' land. Only landless encroachers  may move to step (iv), whereas landowning or
other ineligible  encroachers  are issued  penalty and eviction notices as in step (v). As described earlier,
however,  the incentives for RIs and other tehsil-level officials  to 'book' encroachment  cases in this
manner are very low, as encroachment  represents a lucrative  source for rent-seeking.
The consequences  of this process for various stakeholder  groups are as follows:
Landless: Although  legally entitled to claim rights to 'non-objectionable' land, landless encroachers
must first commit  what is regarded as an unlawful act (encroachment)  and be 'booked' for it before
they are allowed  to press their claim by establishing  'due cause' by virtue of their landlessness.  Only
then, and after due process of law, may they be issued  with the patta which regularises  their land
rights. The entire process hinges upon whether or not the case is 'booked' by the RI in the first place.
There are few or no incentives for the RI to do so and frequently  bribes are demanded or eviction
threatened.  The landless encroacher, if unaware of the their rights under OPLE, is likely willing to
succumb  to the RI's demands in return for temporary access to cultivable land. Even if aware of their
rights, landless encroachers  may still prefer to take the easier option of regularly bribing the RI since
they are also likely to be aware of the numerous transaction  costs incurred at the tehsil office in
initiating  a mutation and obtaining  patta to the land (see Box 12).
Landowners: There are few disincentives under the law for an already landed encroacher to vacate
illegally occupied  government land. The penalties for encroachment  on government  land, fixed in
1976, are set at the very low level of Rs. 100 per acre per year. The assessment is based upon land
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per acre (during rabi season) and Rs. 16 per acre (during kharif) are also levied.  If the land is put to
commercial use (e.g. operating  a rice mill), the penalty is Rs. 10 per day.
Revenue officials: The low penalty and assessment  rates provide  a perverse set of incentives  for the
RI and the tehsildar that actually serve to encourage  encroachment  on government  land. The
imposition and collection of penalties from encroachers  has emerged as an important component  of
the tehsil's income from 'penalty and rent cess', owing  to the now very low levels of land revenue.
Perversely, the tehsildar may be more willing to allow encroachment  on objectionable land since the
penalty amounts to more than the land revenue demand from that land. In Attabira tehsil, Sambalpur
district, for example, the annual income from 'penalty and rent cess' is about Rs. 60,000. According to
the tehsildar, a large proportion of this income derives  from the fines levied on encroachers. The
tehsildar elaborated  that the amount had increased in recent years 'because of increased pressure on
land.' Since land revenue derives from a more or less constant area, we assume that 'increased
pressure on land' is a euphemism  for increased  encroachment  on government  land, thereby increasing
potential  government income from penalties.
It is often the case, especially in unirrigated areas, that encroachers  are evicted but leave only after
harvesting  the crop35. They are likely to return during the following cropping season, however, often
to the same plot of land, and the penalty process starts all over again. The penalty remains constant
irrespective of the number of times a particular farmer encroaches  on government  land.
Box 12: Operation  of the OPLE in Ganjam  district
In Buruda village (Digapandhi  tehsil, Ganjam district), 10-12  families encroach currently  on
government  land. The RI comes every year and instead of 'booking' them takes bribes from them, of
between Rs. 100  and Rs.400, depending on the extent of encroachment.  The current 'going rate' is
about Rs.400 per acre. Often the landless encroachers  have gone to the tehsildar and requested that
their claims to the land be regularised  and pattas be issued in their names. The tehsildar sends the RI
to settle the matter who instead takes bribes. The encroachers  are convinced that the RI must be
passing on a share of the bribe to the tehsildar, and perhaps even to higher-level officers. One
informant encroached on 80 decimels of land and paid a bribe of Rs.370 in 1997.  The RI measures the
land, says he will issue apatta, but never does so. He threatens them, saying that if they fail to pay, he
will not allow them to harvest their crop. This has been going on for the last 15 years.
4.3.4  Conclusion
The discussion in this section reveals  that existing legislation  to prevent encroachment  and alienation
of tribal land have failed in their objectives. Loopholes in the law encourages rent-seeking,  and
complex rules are easily manipulated  by vested interests. The rural poor may acquire defacto but
insecure  rights over revenue wastelands  through encroachment,  but are unable to convert them to the
dejure rights to which they are entitled under the law, and are therefore also denied access to
complementary  resources such as institutional  credit.
3  5  It is rare  that  the tehsildar  would  impound  the standing  crop  and  auction  it, as he is supposed  to do.
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groups. Existing penalties under the OPLE are too low and are rarely enforced. Computerisation  of the
encroachment  register at tehsil level will make possible the ready detection of habitual encroachers.
Increasing  the penalty according  to the frequency of repeat encroachments  may also act as some
disincentive,  although only over the medium-term  rather than the short-term,  and not so long as
incentives  towards rent-seeking remain strong  for low-level  revenue department  officials.
The inefficiencies and distorted incentive structure  that prevail in land revenue administration  are only
likely to be checked with greater  awareness and voice on the part of local communities.  In order for
local groups to be able to press their legal claims,  they first need to know what their rights are. A
combination of awareness-raising  and local organisational  capacity-building,  efforts  to expand  the
effective  powers and accountability  of the panchayati  raj institutions,  increased  vigilance of superior
officers in the revenue administration,  and an informed public opinion (e.g. through readily accessible
manuals in local languages)  are required  in order to protect and promote access to remaining common
land by the rural poor.
4.4  Land tenancy
The abolition of tenancy in order to vest land ownership  with the actual tillers of the land formed  the
corner-stone of most land reform efforts in India after Independence  in 1947.  It was predicated on the
widely (and then largely correctly)  held belief that the tillers of the land were locked in exploitative
relationships with intermediaries  who had little interest in the land but for the extraction of rent. The
Orissa Estates Abolition (OEA) Act, 1952  initially permitted landowners  to resume 33 standard acres
for personal cultivation (section  2.3), which led to the large-scale  eviction of tenants. No parallel
legislation  was introduced to protect  tenants. Under the Orissa Land Reforms (OLR) Act, 1960 (as
amended in 1972), the leasing of land was explicitly  banned, except where lessees fell into certain
excluded  categories36. Under the 'adverse possession' clause in the OLR Act, if it can be
demonstrated  that a tenant has cultivated a parcel of land continuously  for 12 years, permanent
occupancy rights to that land may legally pass to the tenant.  But the institution  of tenancy has proved
to be highly resilient on the ground, for reasons outlined below, and attempts to regulate tenancy by
legislative  means have been counterproductive.  It is as widespread in Orissa as it is illegal, though
now less exploitative and better concealed from official  records.
A substantial  literature now corrects many long-standing  perceptions  that share tenancy is necessarily
inefficient or that landlord-tenant  relations  are necessarily  exploitative  (Otsuka and Hayami 1988,
Singh 1990). Share tenancy represents a second-best  response  to missing, thin and imperfect markets
for land, credit, labour, management,  information,  and insurance,  and performs some very important
functions which would otherwise  have to fulfilled by other institutions; it is neither necessarily
inefficient nor a barrier to the adoption  of new technology;  tenancy contracts often play an important
role in matching land, labour and capital endowments. They are not necessarily  exploitative, but
36  Except  by landlords  with  a disability  or the 'privileged  raiyats'.  A person  under  disability  refers  to: (i) a
widow  or unmarried  woman,  or a woman  divorced  or separated  from  her  husband  by a decree  or order  of
court;  (ii) a minor  or a person  of unsound  mind;  and  (iii)  a person  incapable,  because  of some  other
physical  or mental  disability,  of cultivating  personally  the land  he held  as a raiyat.  Privileged  raiyats
include  (i) trusts  holding  land  for public  purposes;  (ii) charitable  and  educational  institutions  engaged  in
work  for  public  benefit;  and  (iii)  religious  or other  institutions  by which  the public  benefit.
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one sphere can lead to compensatory  shifts in other contracts  to leave tenants net worse off (Mearns
1998).
This section examines the extent and nature of land-lease  (tenancy)  markets and the terms of the
contracts across Orissa to understand how formal restrictions  on tenancy along with loopholes in the
law, its lax implementation,  lack of updated land records, and the manipulation of revenue
administration  by the relatively rich and powerful, combine  to restrict access to land by the rural poor.
4.4.1  Extent and nature of tenancy in Orissa
There is general agreement  that available  data on both the number of tenants and the acreage under
tenancy are underestimates  (Singh, 1988). Both the Census of Land Holdings carried out by the
National Sample Survey Organisation,  and the Agricultural  Census,  tend to underestimate  the
proportion of land under tenancy. However, the former is considered  more reliable as it is based on
independent  household surveys while the agricultural  census is based on a retabulation of the land
records of owner-cultivators. The under-estimation  of tenancy stems from reporting bias as lessors
tend to understate the leased-out area owing  to (i) the fear that tenants will stake claims in favour of
continued right of cultivation; (ii) desire to escape the ceiling on land holdings; or (iii) a combination
of (i) and (ii). The share of operated area leased-in is therefore  considered to be a more reliable
measure of the magnitude of agricultural  tenancy than the share of owned area leased-out as lessees
have fewer incentives  to under-report  the extent of area leased-in  (Narain and Joshi, 1969).
Nonethless, land reform legislation  designed  to prohibit sub-letting,  regulate rents, and confer security
of tenure has given many landlords  and tenants a common interest in concealing  agreements which
may be deemed illegal (Singh, 1988). Only intensive field surveys and careful  village studies can
provide more precise estimates of tenancy since '[Tihe longer the period of stay in villages, the higher
is the tenancy recorded'  (Laxminarayan  and Tyagi, 1977: 880).
Unfortunately,  there is a dearth of surveys and few village studies in Orissa which offer such insights.
This section combines field notes gathered in the course of the present study with material from two
in-depth field studies (Sarap, 1998; Swain, 1998)  to form a partial picture of the extent and nature of
tenancy arrangements in different  parts of Orissa.
It is estimated that on average, 10-20  percent of households  in each village participate in the land-
lease market in Orissa, although  this is subject to wide inter- and intra-regional  variation. Using NSS
data, Swain (1998) reported  that 17 percent of households  leased-in  land in 1981-82. More than 80
percent of the leased-in  area is in the size class of less than 10 acres, and the percentage of leased-in
area to operated area decreases with  the increase  in size of operational  holding. At the same time,
nearly 85 percent of the area leased-out  is by farmers  with less than 10 acres. Together  these results
indicate considerable leasing activity (both in and out) by small and marginal farmners.
Land leasing or tenancy may take the form of fixed rentals or sharecropping arrangements,  in which
rents are paid in cash, in kind, or a combination of the two. Sharecropping  is the predominant,  though
declining,  form of tenurial arrangement  in Orissa. About 42 percent of the leased-in  area is under
sharecropping  as against about 14 and 8 percent respectively  under fixed-produce  and fixed-rent
contracts (Swain, 1998). However, share tenancy seems to be more prevalent in non-irrigated  villages
than in irrigated villages. For example,  Swain (1998) reports  that more than 40 percent of the
operational  area is under share tenancy in a dry village in Dhenkanal  district as against 12-19  percent
in irrigated villages in Cuttack district. This pattern seems  to confirm the persistence of the potential
for risk-sharing  under share-cropping  contracts.
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irrigated villages in Sambalpur  district (Sarap, 1998). Only about 20 percent of land-leasing
households  were found to participate in sharecropping  (bhagidi) contracts.  They were small
landowners and the primary reason for leasing-out  land was their inability  to cultivate land either with
the help of family labour or by hired labour 37. Land leasing on fixed tenancy is of two types: in kind
(kara), when the agreed amount of paddy is delivered after the harvest; and in cash (chhidol) where
the rent is paid up front in cash before the lessee is permitted  to use the land. The kara lessors tended
to be small farmers with limited  access to family and/or hired labour (army personnel,  widows); or
medium farmers  with an adverse land-labour  ratio. Among the chhidol lessors, nearly half resided in
other villages, and leased out their land because these plots were at a distant location and of inferior
quality. The other chhidol lessors  were small farmers  who required funds for urgent purposes. The
rents paid by lessees  varied from Rs. 120  to Rs. 550  per acre per year; this wide range in rents payable
is indicative of the heterogeneous  terms and conditions among such contracts.
Table 14 provides a typology of various land leasing contracts  in different parts of Orissa, and Table
15 summarises  the most common  reasons for leasing land. It is evident that leasing households
participate in the tenancy market in response  to missing markets for labour or draught power.
4.4.2  Terms  of tenancy contracts
Tenants are under no obligation  to lease-in land from a particular lessor. They are quite free to take
their own decisions on how much land area to lease-in and from whom, and are not expected to
provide unpaid labour to the lessor. However, it was commonly reported  that tenants may borrow
money from their landlords and repay the loan with labour contributions.  While there is little evidence
of extra-economic coercion in leasing contracts,  it does appear that some factor markets may be
interlinked. Unlike the situation  that prevailed  prior to Independence,  tenants no longer appear to be
locked into exploitative  relationships  with landlords.  At the same time, they have no legal status
because tenancy is banned.
In leasing out land, landowners  employ various devices to get around the law banning tenancy. Most
contracts are oral and of short duration. Oral contracts  help to ensure that tenants are not recognised in
the updated land records during survey and settlement operations  (section 3.1). At the same time,
short-term contracts (typically  2-5 years), prevent tenants from establishing  claims to land through
'adverse possession'. Under the adverse possession  rule, a tenant who has been in practical possession
of a plot of land for a period of 12 consecutive  years may thereby acquire legal occupancy rights to
that land.
Rule 21 of the Orissa Survey and Settlement  Rules, 1962,  clearly specifies  the particulars that need to
be recorded in the preparation of the RORs. These include the name of each tenant or occupant; the
class to which each tenant belongs; the situation and extent of the land held by each tenant or
occupant; the name of the landlord of each tenant; and the name of each proprietor and landlord.
37 There  is a close  relationship  between  the two, since  hired  labour  normally  requires  supervision  by family
members.
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Form  Terms of contract  Common  among:  Geographical  Whether





equally (1:1) between  Landless, and
landlord and tenant  Small and  small  and
after deduction of  marginal  marginal  Sambalpur  No
expenditure  on  farmers  farmers
chemical  fertilisers or
HYV seeds
Sharecropping  Landless,  and
Gross output divided  Small and  small  and  Cuttack,  Khurda,  Paddy, gram,
equally (1:1) between  marginal  marginal  Gopalpur  lentils and jute
landlord and tenant  farmers  farmers
Gross output divided  Small and  Small and
either (1:2) or (1:3)  marginal  marginal  Cuttack  Potato
between landlord and  farmers  farmers
tenant respectively
Agreed amount (8-10
Fixed tenancy  bags/acre/crop)  to be  Medium  Small and
in kind  paid after harvest;  farmers  marginal  Sambalpur  Paddy
tenant responsible  for  farmers
cultivation
Agreed amount of  Medium  Small and
Fixed tenancy  cash paid to landlord  farmers  marginal  Sambalpur  Paddy
in cash  before getting access  farmers
to land
Source:  Sarap (1998),  Swain (1998), and field notes.
Table 15:  Common reasons for leasing land in Orissa
Leasing-out  Leasing-in
*  Lack of supervisory labour  *  Limited  non-farm employment  opportunities  (i.e.
*  Lack of bullock power  excess labour-land  ratio)
*  Small (uneconomic)  holding  *  Availability  of bullocks
*  Land distant or of poor quality  *  Consolidate  and increase operational  holding
Source:  Sarap (1998),  Swain (1998), and field notes.
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make mention of any existing tenants. During our field investigation,  many instances were reported in
which land rights were mis-recorded  during survey and settlement operations.  Tenants also have good
reason to conceal tenancy, as highlighted  in Box 12. In 1981-82, an estimated 36 percent of all
tenancies in rural Orissa were concealed (Sawant, 1991).
Box 13:  Tenant motivations  for concealing  tenancy
Consider this apocryphal tale of a conversation  between a politician and a tenant in rural Orissa. The
politician said to the tenant, "You have lived on this land for so many years, the land is yours.
Register a case against the landlord." The tenant replied, " How can I start a case against him? I know
this land is his. How can it suddenly  become mine? When I have problems I go to him for help.  We
live in the same village and we see each other every day. You are here now, but after one hour you
will be gone and it will be difficult for me to see you. How can we get their land in our name? It is
not good."
Source: Mohanti (1990)
4.4.3  Policy Implications
The discussion in the preceding sections highlights  that:
- tenancy (whether sharecropping  or fixed-rent)  is as widespread as it is illegal;
*  the rent paid by the lessee is almost always in excess of the legally stipulated rent of one-fourth of
the gross produce;
*  most of those seeking  to lease-in land are either the landless or the small and marginal farmers
suggesting that lease markets are of great importance  as a means for the rural poor to gain access
to land; and
•  both landowners and tenants have their own reasons to conceal  tenancy arrangements.
Tlhis  suggests that:
*  tenancy is a response to missing markets, especially  for labour;
*  rent is determined more by prevalent social and cultural  norms of fairness than by state legislation;
*  most transactions are non-exploitative  as they take place often within the same class of farmers,
and are an effective mechanism  for the poor and the landless to increase access to land, and
*  concealing  of tenancy affects the tenants adversely by denying them security of tenure and
consequently limiting  their access to institutional  credit.
The key policy issue is to devise an effective mechanism  to deregulate  tenancy but at the same time
legally to register and make possible the protection of tenants' rights in land. The question of
deregulating  tenancy has been discussed  in a meeting of the Orissa Cabinet in which opinion was
divided on whether or not to grant tenants new rights. Many Members feared a political backlash
against any move to grant heritable and transferable  rights to the tenants. In principle, at least, it is
possible to specify a 'middle ground' in the hierarchy of rights in which tenants' use rights are
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contracts with protection  under the law would, on the one hand,
*  provide security of tenure to the tenant in the short-term;
*  enable him to access institutional  credit; and thereby
*  improve agricultural  productivity,
and on the other,
*  release more land into the land-lease market  as landowners  would be less fearful of losing their
land through 'adverse possession', and
*  help to increase access to land by the rural poor.
615.  CONCLUSION
5.1  Policy implications
A number of implications for policy are suggested by this analysis. Many, but not all, of these options
are already being considered, or imp'e'~mented  in pilot forms by the Government  of Orissa. A number
of these initiatives are also expected  to be of relevance to other states:
*  Gender and land rights: women's access to and effective control over land may be enhanced
through joint land titling. This measure is rather limited in scope, since ideally what need to be
promoted are women's independent  land rights. But while the principle of joint titling is readily
accepted at the level of the Government  of India, it has yet to be realized in practice in Orissa. In
focus group discussions,  village women assert that their bargaining power vis a vis their husbands
and in-laws would be enhanced considerably  by joint title over land. The common  objection that
this may make it more difficult for women to escape from abusive  marriages was for them a
second order consideration.
*  Organization  of land administration: a critical assessment  of the respective  roles and
responsibilities  of the Department  of Revenue  and the Board of Revenue appears warranted, in
order to identify overlapping  functions  and areas where coordination  between  the two could be
streamlined for increased  efficiency.  In the context of the ongoing computerization  of land records,
it will also be important  critically  to assess the particular responsibilities  of the local-level Revenue
Inspector.  Many of the presumed advantages  of computerization  will not be realized unless
limiting constraints  on RIs' time and the incentive structure within which they work are addressed.
*  Land records and registration: at present, there is little or no coordination  between the
maintenance  of land records, which is the responsibility  of revenue inspectors  and tehsildars; and
land registration, which is the responsibility  of sub-registrars.  Measures to coordinate and integrate
these two services and enhance their efficiency  through computerization  promise to go a long way
towards stimulating  the land market. Of utmost importance  is to combine  registration and mutation
processes, and provide a 'single-window' facility for the registration of sale deeds, correction of
the record of rights in land, and issue of land title. Land records and the registration administration
system should integrated  through a computer  network to facilitate  information exchange  for this
single-window  approach. This should help to reduce the currently  high, informal  transaction costs
to individuals  in the land market. Existing  registration fees and stamp duties should also be
reassessed,  as it is possible that their reduction, hand in hand with proper valuation, could lead to a
net increase in state revenue.
*  Survey and settlement operations: in the context of the computerization  of land records, the
continuing relevance of survey and settlement operations  is questionable.  There is substantial
evidence  that survey and settlement  operations discriminate  systematically  against the rural poor
and socially excluded, whose interests  would be far better served by an efficient service for
registration of land sales, mutation and issuance of title.
*  Simplification and transparency in land administration: Many of the individual  stages involved
in land administration  currently  operate to the disadvantage  of the rural poor and socially excluded
groups. The complexity  of the existing legal framework and a perverse incentive structure provides
considerable  scope for rent-seeking  by the lower-level government  officers with whom landholders
come into direct contact,  while village elites are better able to manipulate  the system to their own
62advantage. The draft Orissa Revenue  Administration  Bill is intended  to simplify, consolidate and
replace the various laws that currently  govern land administration.  However, the extent to which
legislative and organizational  improvements  in land administration  will enhance access to land for
the rural poor, depends to a large extent on the degree of transparency with which land
administration  is conducted in practice. Access to information  and public awareness of rights
appear to be critical factors. The recent initiative  of the Revenue  Department, Government  of
Orissa, to disseminate  a local-language  'how to' manual on matters of land transfers and access to
land records, is a most welcome contribution  in this area, and one from which other states could
learn.
*  Land consolidation: the involvement  of local NGOs in the formation of village committees  for
land consolidation may help to overcome some of the resistance  to consolidation, where
consolidation is genuinely demanded by particular  villages, but where the government-initiated
process is perceived to be insufficiently  participatory.  NGOs could be encouraged  to undertake
mass-awareness  generation by using informal  media techniques (puppetry, folk theatre, etc.) and
create a basis for negotiated and participatory  land consolidation  at village level. The
government's role would be confined  to the correction  of existing land records, demarcation of
common lands, assistance in land measurement,  and preparation  of the new set of land records. To
the extent that both poorer and better-off  farmers  wish voluntarily  to consolidate their holdings in
the interests of raising productivity,  the most effective  public interventions  are likely to be those
that reduce transaction costs in the land market.
E  Encroachment: the most promising avenues for protecting  rights of access to common land for the
rural poor are through efforts  to raise public awareness and access to information.  Some NGOs in
Orissa have been successful in pursuing  public interest litigation to defend tribal land rights.
Following their lead, the strengthening  of local panchayats  could make a vital contribution  towards
promoting the watchdog function of civil society institutions.  Only with strong civil society
institutions  will there be effective  demand from below for accountability within the lower levels of
land revenue administration,  thereby limiting the possibilities  for evasion of the legislation
designed to prevent encroachment  on commons.  With such safeguards in place, the
computerization  of land records at tehsil level would also contribute  towards making information
on the extent of encroachment  more publicly accessible.
*  Tenancy:  liberalization  of the land-lease  market, as proposed in the draft Orissa Revenue
Administration  Bill, and supported  by Government  of India policy under the Ninth Plan, is
therefore cautiously  to be welcomed,  provided that the right balance can be struck between
assuring landlords of their long-term ownership  rights, and assuring  tenants of their security of
tenure and protection  under the law for the duration  of fixed-term  tenancy contracts.  Only with
documentary evidence of such rights are tenants likely to face the possibility of access to
institutional  credit. The government's role would not be to specify the class of cultivators who may
lease out their land, or to set a 'fair' rent as under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, but to ensure that
contracts are upheld.
*  Other market-based approaches to increasing access to land by the poor:  learning from
experience that land encroachment  and tenancy, in spite of being banned, are widespread, the
government might consider additional,  market-based  mechanisms to increase access of land to the
rural poor. For example, a fixed proportion,  say 50 percent, of the revenue wastelands should be
auctioned for a limited, fixed period, for agricultural  purposes. If at the same time, tenancy is
deregulated,  large landowners  may be willing to take land on auction and lease-out  to the small
and marginal farmers for cultivation.  This would increase not only the poor's access to land but
63also government  revenue. The only proviso is that the penalty for encroachment  should be set
high enough to act as a disincentive.
5.2  Stakeholder analysis
The following is a brief summary  of the major stakeholder  groups that have interests in land and land
administration  in Orissa. A number of other stakeholders  have been left out of this analysis, including
civil court lawyers, stamp vendors, and so on. A more complete stakeholder  analysis would need to
consider all such groups.
Government of Orissa: The Department  of Revenue and the Board of Revenue are the government
agencies responsible for land revenue administration.  Between  them, at state level, they are primarily
responsible for policy formulation  and implementation,  and adjudication  of matters relating to land
revenue.
Tehsil-level revenue bureaucracy: The tehsil-level  revenue bureaucracy  is the cutting edge of land
administration.  The key officials at this level comprise the tehsildar, the revenue inspector, the sub-
registrar, the assistant settlement officers and the assistant consolidation  officers. The last two operate
at the level of a range which may or may not be coterminous  with a tehsil. The tehsil-level officers
function under the district collector for revenue administration  and have primary responsibility for
implementing land policy.
Non-Governmental Organizations  (NGOs):  The strength and influence  of the NGO community in
Orissa has grown rapidly in recent years. Some are concerned with the protection of tribal rights to
land and have been instrumental  in initiating  public interest litigation  against the encroachment  and
alienation of tribal land by non-tribals  and in promoting  public awareness on these issues.
Large landowners:  Large landowners,  typically  owning 5-10 acres of irrigated land, constitute  the
village elite, and usually wield considerable  influence  in village society. Much of their influence is
derived from their control over land, labour and credit markets in the village. Although their power
has been eroded to some extent by land reforms,  they are still able to manipulate  the land
administration  system  to their advantage  by building  coalitions  with the tehsil-level bureaucracy.  They
usually lease out part of their land or hire wage labourers  to cultivate  their land as they diversify into
non-agricultural  occupations.
Small and marginal landowners:  These are usually owner-cultivators  with about 1-5 acres of irrigated
land. Adjustments  in operational  holdings (e.g. in relation  to the availability  of labour or draught
power) may be possible by leasing-in or leasing-out  additional  land. Agriculture is their main source
of livelihood, though accompanied  by seasonal  non-farm labour.
Landless  farmers: They do not own any land but rely on their own labour for a livelihood, by hiring
themselves out to other farmers as labourers. They are an important  stakeholder  group in land. Often
they attempt to increase access to cultivable land by encroaching  on government  wastelands or village
commons.
Women:  Women, even in better-off  households, are considered  a land-poor  category owing to social
norms and customs that, in spite of legal rights, deny them access to land.
64Tribal communities:  Orissa has a large tribal population which has traditionally relied upon forest
land and resources for their livelihoods.  Their access to and control over land often continues to be
determined by custom. There are legal provisions  to prevent tribal land alienation by non-tribals,
which operate with varying degrees of effectiveness.
Using this simplified  list of stakeholders,  Table 16 summarises  the possible consequences  of the
policy options suggested in section 5.1 for each stakeholder  group.
As a second step in the stakeholder  analysis, it is then useful to summarise  potential conflicts and
complementarities  of interest between stakeholder  groups in the form of a simple matrix, as shown in
Table 17. The shaded cells highlight the probable sources of resistance to the main policy options
suggested by this study. Most obviously, large landowners  may be expected to use their political
influence  to thwart the Government's attempts  to formulate  policies that aim to increase  the poor's
access to land or to improve  the 'efficiency' of land revenue administration,  if this means they have
less chance of manipulating  it in their own favour.  Legislation  to de-regulate  tenancy might also be
expected to meet with stiff opposition  owing  to the complementarity  of interests between  the large
landowners  and the legislators.
The state government  might also need to be particularly  mindful of the possible resistance to policy
reform from the tehsil-level  revenue officers. It may prove necessary for the state-level revenue
administration  to build coalitions  with selected junior officers  to implement  the new policies
successfully.  This will also be necessary  given the strong  nexus of interests  at village level between
large landowners  and tehsil-level  revenue officers, which could so easily derail any casual attempts at
reform.
5.3  Suggestions for follow up
A pilot study is constrained  by its exploratory  nature. It is suggested  that further state-level  studies be
conducted,  in selected states, applying  the approach that has been tested here. The Annex specifies  the
minimum amounts of time required to conduct certain stages of the field investigation.  The time
required  will naturally increase with an increase in the number of districts selected for analysis.
Priority states for subsequent  studies would include Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
Several criteria have guided their selection. Andhra Pradesh  is a former ryotwari area with a
relatively  high agricultural  growth rate, and demonstrated  willingness  to pursue improvements in land
administration  (relative success with land consolidation,  registration  of informal  tenancies, progress
with computerization  of land records, and reform of the land administration  agencies. Uttar Pradesh
is a former zamindari area with high rates of tenancy and in which the need to deregulate land-lease
market has been identified as an urgent priority. It also offers a relatively successful precedent  with
land consolidation, and a plethora of village studies and secondary  data. West Bengal is also a former
zamindari area with high tenancy rates, and which has received wide acclaim for the systematic
recording of tenants' rights under 'Operation Barga'.
65Table 16:  Who  will benefit  and how: stakeholder  analysis
Policy Option  Government of  Tehsil-level revenue  NGOs  Large land  Small and  Landless  Women  Tribals
Orissa  bureaucracy  owners  marginal farmers  farmers
Issue jointpattas  to  Y  N  N  y  y
husband  and wife  (Promotion  of  social  justice)  . (Reduced  perceived  (Reduced  perceived  (Increased  access  to  (Make  land
control  over  family  control  over family  land  and control  alienation
land)  land)  over  land-related  more  difficult)
________________  _____________________  ~~  ~~  ~~decisions)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Evaluate the role of DRE  Y  N  N  _
and BOR,  and of the RI  (Increased  work  efficiency)  (Reduced  potential  for rent-  (Reduced  ability  to  (Reduced  delays  and
seeking)  manipulate  the  rent-seeking)
system)
Abolish survey and  Y  N  N  Y  Y
settlement  operations  (Reduced  costs)  (Reduced  potential  for rent-  (Reduced  ability  to  (Reduced  rent-seeking;  (Make  land
seeking)  manipulate  the  less potential  for losing  alienation
system)  land  to powerful  more difficult)
interests)
Combine registration and  Y  N  Y  Y  Y
mutation  (Increased  revenue  with  less  (Reduced  potential  for  rent-  (Reduced  (Reduced  transaction  (Reduced  transaction
incentive  to undervalue  seeking)  transaction  costs)  costs)  costs  in the  event of
property)  land  purchase)
Systematic  Y  N  Y  N  Y  Y
computerization  of land  (Increased  work  efficiency)  (Reduced  potential  for rent-  (Improved  (Reduced  ability  to  (Improved  access  to  (Make  land
records  seeking)  access  to land-  manipulate  the  land-based  information  alienation
based  system)  more difficult)
information
Involve NGOs in land  Y  N  Y
consolidation  and  (Improvement  in land  (Reduced  potential  for rent-  (Increased
awareness-raising  consolidation  and ag.  seeking)  recognition  of
Productivity;  Strengthening  their  role)
of civil  society)
Strict monitoring  of  V  N  V  N  N  V  Y
encroachment  (Increased  redistribution  of  (Reduced  potential  for rent-  (Reduced  costs  (Lose  defacto  (Lose  defacto access  to  (Increased  prospect  (Make  land
wasteland)  seeking)  of litigation)  access  to  encroached  land)  of  getting  rightful  alienation
encroached  land)  access  to land)  more difficult)
Tenancy de-regulation  Y  N  N  Y
(Improved  agricultural  (Reduced  potential  for  rent-  (Gradual  erosion  of  (Increased  access  to
productivity  through  secure  seeking)  power  and social  land  and  security  of
land  access  to efficient  status  in village  tenure)
farmers)  society)
66Table  17:  Conflict and complementarity  in stakeholder  interests
GOO  Tehsil-level  NGOs  Large  Small and  Landless  Women  Tribals
revenue  landowners  marginal  farmers
bureaucracy  farmers
GOO  _  Y  *  *  - i










Notes:  Conflicts of interest are represented  by *, complementarities  of interest by v. The size of the symbol
represents  the extent of the conflict  or complementarity.  The shaded areas indicate the probable sources of
resistance to policy change.
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69ANNEX:  Data Sources And Strategy For Field Investigation
Data Sources
Study theme  Primary  Secondary  Government Records
Sale  Difficult  to collect  in a short  Village  studies/research  from  Data  on registration  of sale deeds
time  because  of sluggish  land  state-level  social  science  available  from  the sub-registrar  (at
sale  market.  research  institutes  or  the tehsil)  or the district  sub-
Focus  group  discussions  in  universities  a useful source.  registrar  (at the district).
villages  may be helpful;  RI  Few studies  examine  the  Sale  transactions  can  also be
can provide  circle-level  working  of the land sale  picked  up from  the mutation
information.  market  because  of infrequent  register  maintained  at the
sales.  tehsildar's office.
Fragmentation  Very  difficult  to collect  in a  Few systematic  studies  exist  Data  on fragments  of holdings
short  time. Villagers  often  on land  fragmentation.  routinely  collected  prior to the start
reluctant  to discuss  because  of  of consolidation  to assess  whether
fear  of ceiling  restrictions.  a village  is 'consolidable'.  This
Detailed  discussions  with  data  is rarely used subsequently.
Assistant  Consolidation  NSS-data  (various  rounds)  is
Officer  may be helpful.  another  source  though  at a high
level of aggregation.
Encroachment  Focus  group discussions  with  Few systematic  studies  exist  Encroachment  register  at the
groups  of villagers  can be  on encroachment  of revenue  Tehsildar's  office  the only source
helpful.  If time  not a  wasteland  or village  of information  on extent of
constraint,  rural  residence  can  commons.  encroachment  of government  land
provide  extensive  information  in the tehsil, but data should  be
on encroachment.  treated  with considerable  caution
given incentives  for  Rls not to
'book' encroachment  cases.
Tenancy  Very  difficult  to collect  in a  Socio-economic  village  Not collected  by the state
short time. Focus  group  studies  a useful  source.  They  government.  Independent  studies
discussions  can help in  often  provide  information  on  conducted  by IAS probationers  at
ascertaining  the main  the tenancy  market  even if not  the Lal Bahadur  Shastri  National
contractual  terms  and other  a subject  of direct  study.  Academy  of Administration,
variations.  Difficult  to get a  However,  being confined  to a  Mussoorie  can be helpful.
handle  on the extent  of  few villages  is a major
tenancy  since  villagers  limitation.  Thus,  necessary  to
reluctant  to disclose  consult  a large  number  of
information.  studies.
70Strategy for reliable data collection with an approximate of length of time required
Owing to variations in data availability and quality, it is necessary to optimise research time in data collection.
An outline of a strategy is presented below. As is evident, different data are available at different levels of
administration. Data pertaining to the same issue may be available at different levels of aggregation from more
than one level of administration, and should be triangulated with one another.
Strategy/ Activity  Level of Administration
Sale
Si  Review  existing  secondary  literature  (village  studies);  State,  district  and tehsil headquarters
conduct  in-depth  interviews  with  researchers  and tehsil-
level  revenue  officials
S2  Consult  government  records  for  selected  tehsils  Tehsil  headquarters
S3  Conduct  focus  groups in selected  villages  Village
S4  Cross-check  focus  group results  with revenue  officials  District  and tehsil  headquarters
Fragmentation
Fl  Get data  on fragmentation  from consolidation  officials  Range,  district  and tehsil
Encroachment
El  Discuss  with District  Collectors  and tehsildars;  examine  District  and tehsil headquarters
tehsil-level  encroachment  register
E2  Conduct  focus  groups  and rapid  surveys  Village
E3  Cross-check  focus  group  results  with  revenue  officials  District  and tehsil headquarters
Tenancy
Ti  Review  existing  secondary  sources  (village  studies);  State,  district  and tehsil  headquarters
conduct  in-depth  interviews  with researchers  and  tehsil-
level  revenue  officials
T2  Conduct  focus  groups  in selected  villages  Village
Activity  Minimum time required in person-days*
S1  +Tl  7
S2+FI  +El  10
S3 + E2 + T2  I per focus  group  discussion
S4+  E3  3
Note:  * The time estimate is for a medium-sized state like Orissa. A state the size of UP would probably
require about twice this amount of time.
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